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This thesis is a defence of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s Conception of Reason.  It    begins 
by  stating  the  origin of Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze’s  thought  on  reasoning  in  
philosophy, the conflict  raised  by  the  concept  of  universal  reason  in  philosophy, and 
the new way of viewing  diversity  as presented by Eze.  Generally, this study critiques the  
concept  of  reasoning  in  philosophy  as  viewed  by  philosophers  from  different  
backgrounds  with  two  conceptions  of  reason.  These  conceptions  include the ‘Universal  
reason’  and  the  ‘Ordinary  reason’  which  this study also examines. In this light, the 
study focuses and delimits its contentions on Eze’s conception of reason as ordinary rather 
than universal. 
Reasoning  is  an  act  or  an  exercise  of  thought carried  out  by    individuals,  and  it  is  
worth  acknowledging  that  the  individuals  in  this  world  are  completely  diverse  in  all  
perspectives. Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze  speaks  of  diversity  as  a  thing  that  always  
exists, and  enumerates  different ways  in  which  diversity is  generally  noticed  and  
expressed  in  our  everyday language.  For  example,  diversity is  always  talked about in 
terms  of  race,  gender, and  class,  which  Eze  refers to  as  the  ‘trinity’.  Critics of 
contemporary times usually set these categorisations as a reference in many cases1. 
However, Emmanuel  Eze  looks at  diversity  as  a  good  thing  which  must  never  be  
condemned  but  rather  be  embraced.  This  is  evident  in  his  postulation that  “there  is  
another  meaning  to  diversity, a  meaning  somewhat  removed  from  the  present  cultural  
and  political  contestations of  the  term  through  which  we  can  understand  identity”2.  
By  mentioning  this,  Eze  was  clearly  paving  his  path  to   the  criticism  of  the  
‘Universal  Sameness’.  In  his  writing,  Emmanuel  Eze  vividly highlights    that  diversity  
exists  both in  thought or  reasoning,  which he explains stating that  “in  this  thoughtful  
act  the  diversity  in  reason  poses  a  particular  problem  for  any  identity that  legitimately  
wishes  to constitute  itself  as  historical  singularity”3.  Given this, I  see  Eze  as  a  
                                                          
1 E.C Eze (2008) “On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism”. Duke University 
press. P 2 




philosopher  who    believed  that  diversity  is part  and  parcel  of existence  itself. This is 
especially given his belief that diversity is also manifests in thought and not just in the 
political and social realm.  In  his  world view  it  is  clear  that “without  diversity there  is  
no  thought, and without thought there is no mind”4.  
In  this  thesis I    defend  Eze’s  refutation  of  the  notion  of  reason  as  universal.  In  so  
doing  I  start  by  examining  what  Western  philosophers  wrote  about  other  nations,  
specifically  at  the  writings  of  David Hume   and  Immanuel  Kant  who  seem  to  have  
thought  that  their  reasoning  or  philosophy  was  universal.  Within  this  work  I  also  
look  at  the  ways  in  which  this  idea  of  universal  reason  may  be  defended  by  those 
who  agree  with  it.  Furthermore   this  writing  argues  for  the  Ordinary  way  of  
reasoning  which speaks  to  the  nature  of  diversity  as  it  exists  in  this  world. This 
study is motivated by the  conflicting  views of philosophers  relating to  the  manner  of  
reasoning; and to the notion where some  philosophers  seem  to  be  wanting  to  
universalise  reasoning,  while  others  do  not  consider  that  a  progress  at  all.  Owning 
to these  conflicting  views Eze  came  up  with  another  way  of  viewing  diversity  in  
reasoning  which  encourages  philosophers to embrace it rather than  renounce it.  
Consequently,  this  thesis analyses,  critiques and  assesses  all    arguments  for  both  
Universal  reason  and  Ordinary  reason.  In essence, the aim of this study is to unearth  
the  reasonableness  of  rejecting  the  idea  of  Universal  reason  and  embracing  Ordinary  
reason by drawing largely from the work of Eze.  Eze started his writing by referring to the 
writings of Rene Descartes, wherein Descartes calls to mind that the science of ‘human’ is 
more important than all other sciences that exist in the world5. Eze discusses Descartes 
writings of 1637 where he dealt with the question of “l’homme” which means ‘the man’6.  
According to Eze, the question of man constitutes an inquiry, which when resolved would 
create a fundamental principle of formulating the reconstruction of all philosophy and 
science7. From this, Eze8 elaborates that Descartes question of “what am I” was made clear. 
This is in the sense that, the inquiry is not only limited to explaining ontological make up 
                                                          
4 Ibid, p 3 
5 R. Descartes (in Eze, 2001) Ch.  1     p2 
6 Ibid, p 1 
7 Eze  (supra 5) 
8 2001, Ch p2 
3 
 
of man but extends to the epistemological explanation of what man can know. Thus in 
Descartes’ meditations, he stated that “a man” is nothing but a thinking thing because that 
is the only thing that everyone can absolutely fail to doubt about himself9. As further 
articulated by Descartes, the failure of this doubt would occur when a person thinks to 
doubt his thinking, in which the process in fact involves thinking. Because of this, thinking 
is the ‘essence’ of man10. In this view, Descartes could be taken to be one of the traditional 
western philosophers who did not show any aspect of differential regard or disregard of 
others (also referred to as racial discrimination) in his philosophy. This simply is because 
he did not regard the material characteristics of a human as the constitutive factor of a 
‘man’. Generally speaking, the philosophical views of Descartes do not give rise to the 
issue of racism because his philosophy does not speak of a human as a racial animal, but 
rather a being that is endowed with the faculty of thought11. In my view therefore, this is 
the kind of philosophical thought that made Eze to start considering whether there  can ever 
be views that completely do not have or support racism, that is, views that can be supportive 
of what is suggested as the ‘Universal reason’. 
In his writings, Eze draws attention to the philosophies of Hume and Kant.  Eze12 advances 
that although Hume is renowned as a foe of prejudice and intolerance, he is also notorious 
as a founder of racism in philosophy. In his desire to expose intentionality of Hume’s 
racism, Eze assays Hume’s essay “Of National Characters13”, which addresses the topic of 
race. Hume did not write much about issues of race14 in his original essay written in 1748, 
the which he later revised between 1753 and 1754 and before his death in 1777 to add  a 
footnote.According to Eze, this revision by Hume was indicative of the fact that he indeed 
was interested in talking about human difference as a significant element in philosophy; 
were it not so, he would have not displayed perseverance in expressing it.15 In Eze’s view, 
it is evident that Hume meant what he expressed about race in his footnote, given that it 
                                                          
9 R.  Descartes  (supra  5) 
10 Ibid ,   p5 
11 Ibid,  pp 53-54 
12E. C  Eze  (2001)  Achieving Our Humanity: The  Idea  of  Postracial  Future.  Ch 2 (introduction) 
13 D.  Hume.  “Of  National  Characters”,  in  Race  and  Enlightenment. Ed E.  C   Eze  1997,  Ch 3,  
pp298-299 
14 Eze  (supra 12) 
15 D.  Hume (in Eze,  2001,  Ch 2) 
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continually resurfaced in his successive revised versions.   One of the many factors 
indicative of the fact that racism was really intrinsic in Hume’s philosophy included his 
affronting of Professor James Beaty “a bigoted silly fellow”16 when he challenged his 
footnote in 1770. Eze argues that Hume was committed to arguments of  racism because 
he  was  one  of  the  empiricist philosophers committed  to  physical  categories  of  essence, 
such as gender and race. This  simply spells out that  diversity  in  thought  was manifested  
in  terms  of  race  long  ago  and that Western  philosophers  had  long been  known  to 
produce  thoughts  that  undermine  non-Westerners. 
In Hume’s footnote, he simply divided the nations of the world into five categories, where 
he clearly stated that all other nations are naturally inferior to the whites. He distinctly 
specified that race determines the level at which one’s capacity of philosophical reasoning 
can be measured17.  Emmanuel Eze supposes that the reason Hume perceived that  other 
nations are inferior to whites is because he (Hume) believed that there was something 
naturally intrinsic in whites that gives them access to a higher level of philosophical 
reasoning18.  Hume claimed that for any human to access philosophical reasoning, there 
are seven ‘relations of ideas’ that a person has to transcend. These include “resemblance, 
identity, space, time, quantity, quality, contrariety, as well as cause and effect”19. To Hume 
therefore, these relations of ideas laid the foundations of knowledge, science and art, and 
was not only limited to the relative construction of the mind or selfhood unity20. As stated 
by Eze, Hume clearly believed that the mind becomes human only (and only) when it has 
gone beyond the “common relations” of resemblance, space, and time. Hume also held that    
the transcending of the mind from common relations leads it to it gain the capacity to 
engage in self-reflection, which is very important for the existence of the self as the same 
thing over time. 21 Hume contended in his writings that the existence of the ‘self’ is solely 
                                                          
16 Eze  (supra 12)  p 52 
17 D  Hume “Of National Characters”, in Race and Enlightenment.  Ed E. C Eze .1997.  Ch 3,  pp298  -
299 
See Eze (2001) Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of  Postracial  Future.  Ch 2   pp  66-68 
18 Eze  (supra  12),  p 65 
19 Hume  (supra 18) 
See  Eze  .2001.   Ch 2 65 
20 Eze,Ibid  
21 Ibid  
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dependent on the capacity of knowledge and science, which can never come into existence 
until self-generating tasks of the mind have come into existence22. Therefore Hume saw 
knowledge to be the “key feature of human nature” because it exhibits the “unique aspect 
of a human subjectivity”23. 
Through  all his arguments, Hume attempted to point out that only the white race has that  
natural capability to transcend what he termed “common relations” to the other four 
relations, of which all the other non-Western  nations not only lack it, but also the capacity 
to have art and science.24 By this, Hume meant that non-Western nations did not have the 
capacity for knowledge that would enable them to transcend ‘common relations’ in all 
directions whether ontologically (psychological) or cognitively25. As pointed out by Eze, 
Hume extremity in his racist arguments saw him using Negroes as “the paradigm of this 
racial inferiority”26. Hume mentioned that the natural differences in terms of endowments 
put by nature amongst humans did not only end in being differences by race, but deeper to 
the endowment of races with resources or tools needed for developing the mind and 
progress in their culture27. As such, he argued that, some races are naturally richer in mental 
capacities than others, but the white race to be specific is above all. This view is evident in 
Hume’s footnote, where he stated “I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all other 
species of men …to be naturally inferior to the white”28. In this case Eze points out that 
Hume was directly speaking of natural inferiority of other races and natural superiority of 
whites in terms of race, and this was more clearer in the phrase wherein  Hume  said “there  
never was  a civilised  nation of any complexion  other  than white”29.  
In the second revised version of his writings, Hume removed other groups, that is, 
Mexicans from this position of inferiority by nature, but remained unshaken in referring to 
Negroes  or  Africans  as  an inferior race and as Negro slaves who were dispersed all over 
                                                          
22 ibid 
23 Hume  (in  Eze, 2001)  ibid 
24 Eze  (supra  12)  p 66 
25 ibid 
26 Ibid  
27 Eze (supra 24),  p 66 
28 Ibid, p 67 
29 Ibid  
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Europe had not ever discovered or invented anything30. Hume went on to argue  his  point  
by comparing whites  with  the Negroes when he emphasized  that  even  the lowest class 
of white people usually work their way up until they  eventually distinguish themselves in 
high profession or higher qualification31. From this line of argument Hume concluded that 
“the uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages if 
nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men”32. The 
implication of Hume’s statement as interpreted by Eze is that whites have the capability of 
using their reasoning actively while Negroes do not have that capability at all. This to Eze 
proves beyond reasonable doubt that racism manifests in seeing races as different and then 
concludes that even in their nature they are not equal. When Hume33 explained that “All 
kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but comparison […]” Eze further explains various 
types of mental activities concerning this process of comparison. Eze states that there are 
three  of  them; the first  is when  both compared objects are physically  available  to  the  
senses,  the  second is when  only  one  of  the compared  objects is  available,  and  the  
third  is  when  both objects of comparison are unavailable  to the senses34. Further looking 
at Hume’s statement that the ‘eminence’ or superiority of one’s thought must be able to 
perceive things that are not yet in the senses but present in faculty of thought35, Eze points 
out that Hume (and all those who thought/think likewise) were and are racists.  
Understandably,  Eze  is of the believe  that  such  kind  of  thinking  does  not  only  exist  
in  Hume’s  mind, that is, to  see  people  as  diverse  and  to  see  their  thoughts  as  
different  from  others, always  exists. 
 According to Hume, Negroes only possessed the ability to know what they had 
experienced or what was currently available to their senses. This meant that by nature, a 
Negro had a passive mind while whites were endowed with active minds that could foresee 
the future36 (Eze, 2001, ch 2: 68). Eze pushes this argument further to allege that Hume 
regarded Negroes as having the same status as animals, given that Hume in his previous 
                                                          
30 Ibid  
31 Ibid  
32 Ibid  
33 Eze (supra 24) p 67 
34 Ibid  
35 Eze  (supra 12) p 68 
36 Eze (supra 12) p 68 
7 
 
script   on “nonhuman animals” alleged that they only possess the capacity to enjoy basic 
levels of relations of  ideas. Hence his view that Negroes have the ability to experience37 
(taken from what Hume wrote in the section “Of the Reason of Animals” in the Treatise). 
Reflecting on Hume’s inscriptions on animal objects, Eze expresses that when an animal 
has been beaten in a certain place she may forget, but when she sees that place again, her 
passive mind which operates with only the basic relations will then remember the 
experience38. In this light, Hume made it clear that the three lower relations, which are 
continuity and causation (as well as resemblance) although not very remarkable, are shared 
similarly both by humans and beasts39. Eze purports that the perspective of Hume’s 
“experimental reasoning” as present both in beasts and humans, is nothing but a set of 
instincts or a mechanical power that operates unconsciously and as such, it is not governed 
by any relations in the same way as the objects in the human intellectual faculties are 
governed40. The significance of Eze pinpointing this fact is that it brings to light Hume’s 
active regard of others as non-human and others as superior. Eze calls this ‘racism by 
commission’, which hinders strongly the acceptance of the idea of the ‘universal reason’. 
Besides David Hume, Kant also regarded ‘natives’ existence as having no status of 
importance beyond that of a stupid animal (a sheep). For example he spoke of the Negroes 
in Tahiti as things that would never be uplifted to the level of human beings unless white 
Europeans intervene and elevate them41. Eze remarks that Kant slightly showed that whites 
were committing injustice by their cruel actions to the nations that they invaded, colonised, 
and maltreated, and so forth, which he termed “the inhospitable actions of the civilised”42. 
However Kant himself in his writings exposed racist views when he stated that ‘when one 
person aggrieves another person this should be condemned and be regarded as unlawful or 
completely illegal’43. In saying “a person” he was speaking about none other than 
Europeans, who in his view were governed by law; unlike the ‘savages’ who were not 
                                                          
37 Ibid, p 68-69 
38 Hume  in  Eze (supra 16) 68-69 
39 Ibid  
40 Ibid  
41 Eze (supra 12)  Ch 3 
42 Ibid (introduction in Ch 3) 
43 Eze (supra 12), Ch 3,  p 78 
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under any law and therefore were not fitting to his mention of “a person”44. Eze speaking 
about Kant’s writings, points out that the violence used by Europeans over the natives was 
a method or a part of developing them, to take them out of the ‘state of nature’ and put 
them (by force) into what I may term ‘the state of law’ like Europeans. 
Furthermore, Kant argued that it was acceptable for one person to rise against another 
person who is aggressive and violating human rights, but the requirement or a prerequisite 
rather, is that they are both governed by law45 (In Eze, 2001, ch 3: 79 quoted paragraph). 
He virtually meant that if one person is governed or subjected to the law then should he 
commit an aggressive action over the one who has no law, there is no need for the aggrieved 
one to protest. As Eze points out, the rise of the ‘natives’ demanding  their freedom and 
respect was viewed by Kant as nothing worthwhile, since for Kant, “Freedom of the natives 
either as individual or as nation was not considered … as worthy of respect by 
Europeans”46. According to Kant, it was natural that other races would never reach the 
level of maturity and civilisation, therefore qualifying them as forever inferior to the white 
race47. Eze’s aim of highlighting this perspective by Kant is to show how dangerous and 
evil racism can be upon people. In addition, Kant believed that whites in terms of beauty 
are naturally endowed with law, and divine beauty profoundly imbued in their race48. But, 
as far as other races are concerned it has never been imagined that Negroes are capable of 
being intellectual, moral, or capable of aesthetic experience that is more than just an 
insignificant level49. Kant made it more clear  that  blacks  lack  the  concept  of   beauty  
because  they  live  in the state of nature where everything is sensually experienced, and 
there is no way for them appreciating intellectual experience of things in a level more than 
just a “sensual  charm”50. 
In talking about issue of races and differences Emmanuel Eze also referred to the writings 
of Douglass, Du Bois, Gates and West, stating that “there is a tension, a positive one […] 
                                                          
44 Ibid, pp 78-79 
45 Eze (supra 12) Ch 3, p 81 
46 Ibid, p 79 
47 Eze, (supra 46) 
48 Ibid  
49 Kant in  Eze (supra 46), see  the  last  sentence  in  the  middle  paragraph  of  that page. 
50 Ibid, p 82 
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between of the defence of a future without racial discrimination”51. In his writings, Eze 
imagines that  state of  life  where  everyone is  a  brother or  a  sister  to  another person, 
where  the racial bonds have been broken and eliminated completely. He argues that the 
attitude of being immoral and carelessly regarding individuals and groups as ‘others’ 
happens in two ways. Firstly, it happens by omission in the case whereby one finds himself 
more loving and caring for one’s own kind, and then (which sometimes happen without 
seriously noticing) attributes negative social importance to those that are (by default) 
outside one’s own kind. Secondly it is deliberate when someone actively and consciously 
excludes others that deserve care and love from his group on the basis of ‘race’52. So in 
this perspective Emmanuel Eze53 argues that “racism or racial discrimination  manifests  
itself as a refusal  to  love  others, that is,  those who  are  considered literally or 
metaphorically non-brothers and non-sisters”. In this given, he probes what would be the 
importance of race when the goal of loving and caring for all, irrespective of colour, race, 
religion, sexual orientation, etc., has been achieved. To this inquire, he resolves by further 
asking that “if love knows no boundaries, racial or otherwise, of what use are these 
boundaries when love triumphs?”54  All things considered, I may argue that in reading 
Eze’s writing and his reference to these kinds of critical questions, he was indeed trying to 
point out that racism and racial discrimination is evil.   However, it has remains present 
and will continue to occur   since diversity will always exist. 
Taking  into  account  that  Eze  mentions clearly  that  racism is a noticeable condition  as  
evident in the views of  Western philosophers (David Hume  and  Emmanuel  Kant),  I, in 
this study, examinehis  argument  for a  non-racial  future  and  the existence  of  ‘universal  
reason’. In my view Eze succeeds in his argument because if people start showing love for 
and towards one another, then it is clear that some people would not be regarded as others 
and therefore would not be treated as inferior for some natural reasons. That  is, if  and  
only  if  such  an  era  will ever  come  to  be  really  true  in  this  diverse  world.  I also 
think his explanation of racism as happening in two ways (omission and commission) is 
                                                          
51 Eze (supra 46)  Ch 6,  p 181 
52 E. C  Eze  Achieving  Our  Humanity. (2001).  Ch. 6    p179 
53 Ibid  
54 Ibid  
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useful so that a person may know that it is not only when one is willingly harsh  to others  
that one become racist, but  also when one favours one group more than another. To me, 
Eze at this point has been pointing out all angles of racism in western philosophy, and I 
believe if everyone can be committed to loving all and always seeking to regard all people 
as one big family, then many racial ills can be eliminated.  Eze starts his argument by using 
the example of the way of thinking, that is non-racist thinking, and I personally think that 
he has provides a clear proof that one can think and produce a philosophy that does not 
contain racism. Eze’s argument seems to propose the Cartesian way of thinking, which 
does not look at physical features when talking about people/ humans but rather at deeper 
constitutive components of humans55. Eze also considers Descartes statement that a human 
is a thinking thing  regardless  of  whether  he  is  an  African  or  a  Westerner, and then 
suggests that through biological science it has been found that there is little difference 
between a white man and a black man. 
In view of the above, it is evident that Eze  really studied the  philosophical  views  of  the  
known  giants  of  Western  philosophy. He notes  that  they  regarded  their  way  of  
thinking  as  the  only  way  to  think. Furthermore,  they considered  Africans  (Negroes)  
as  having  no  thought  process  or  a  way  of  reason.  In  fact  many  Westerners  who  
followed  the  same  route  of    Hume,  Kant   and  others  like  G. Wilhelm  Hegel56  faced  
a  serious  problem  when  talking  of  Africa  as  having  a  philosophy,  because  they  
thought  of  Africa  in the light of tradition  and  the  West  in the light of philosophy.  Eze  
saw  this  as  a  serious  problem  from  baseless  tendencies  of  racism  and  differential  
discrimination  (which  causes  difficulties  in  welcoming  natural  diversity) within  the 
field  of  philosophy.  From  these, Eze perceives   it  unfair  that  the  West  look(ed)  down  
upon  African  thought, deeming  it  unsuitable  to  be  called philosophy  and  at  the  same  
time  pushing  the  idea  that  there  can  be   something  like  a  ‘Universal  reason’. Eze  
suggests  that   a  thought  is  a  thought  and  it  must  be  seen  as  such,  whether  it  comes  
from  Africa  or  from  the  West.  In general ,  Eze  sees these perspectives  as  an  issue  
of  conflict  within  philosophy,   since when  a  thought  emanates  from  Africa,  expressing  
African  experiences, it  is  not regarded  as  a  thought  or  it is taken as a  thought  of  less  
                                                          
55 See Descartes’ Treatise on Meditation  
56 Eze (supra 12) 
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value.   So within  this  study I  intend  to  point  out  how  the  conflict  arises  around  the  
idea  of  universal  reason  and  how   to  support  Eze’s  view  of  the  impossibility  of   
pure   universal  reason. 
Following from above, this study presents its assessments and arguments in three chapters. 
Chapter One constitutes of a presentation of the groundworks of Eze’s thought, and spells 
out how insensitive Western philosophers write about other nations. Chapter  Two  explain  
how  reasonable  it  is  to  dismiss  the  idea  of  universal  reason  in  order  to find the 
reality and  genuineness  of  reason. Chapter Three  delves into the  challenges  that  may  
be  given  against  the  dismissal  of  the  idea  of  universal  reason. In effect, the study 
argues and concludes that it is not charitable to dismiss ordinary reason in philosophy 
 
 





 The origin of Emmanuel Eze’s thought 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the origin of Emmanuel Eze’s thought and the reasons behind the 
expression and manner of his thought. Likewise, the chapter looks at the thoughts  of  
Western  philosophers  and  the  response  by  African  philosophers,  as well as   how  
Western  philosophers  wrote/write  about  other  nations  or  those  they regard  as  different  
from  them. This  is done  with the aim of establishing    that  it  is  most  likely  that  when  
Westerners  think  about  something  called  ‘universal  reason’  they  simply  think  of  
their  system  of  reason.Eze  as a  thinker  believes  that  thoughts  should  be  expressed  
freely  in  a  constructive  way  that  expresses the experiences  of  individuals  as  they are.  
He believes that the idea that philosophy is universal is a false assumption, given, that any 
system of thought that satisfies systematic logic it can be accepted as philosophy.  He  takes  
this  argument  further, stating that  regarding  other  ways  of  thought  as  no  thought  or  
as  inferior  thought,  is  a  failure  to  acknowledge  diversity. This as such is the reason 
behind the misguided conception that Africa has tradition while the West has philosophy.57  
For Eze,  it  becomes  more  unacceptable when  people  think   that  there  is  what  can  
be termed  ‘Universal  reason’. This is because, Eze realized through his readings and 
writings that the philosophies of those who thought they were producing the universal 
philosophy of all times, were flawed. In concurrence with Eze, T. Edward Damer58  asserts 
that “being  just  and  fair  demands  that  we  speak  of  things  as  we  experience  them   
happening,  not  talking  about  things  in  a  space  somewhere  far  from  this  natural  
world”. Taking from this, it becomes  clear  that  if philosophy  is  produced  by individual  
human  beings  in  this  world,  then it should  not  be  representing  something  universal 
in  nature.  
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Herbert Marcuse59 highlighted  in his works that  “the  rise  of  the  conception  of  
something  like  the  ‘Universal  thought’  is   just   a  method  of  putting  Western  
philosophy  into  dominion  over  all  other  ways  of  reason”.  This  is  clearly  noticeable  
because  if  Africa  has  no  capacity  to  think  philosophically (as  David  Hume  and  
Immanuel  Kant  claimed)  then  it   is  not  clear how  their  way  of  reason  will  be  
encompassed  in  that  so-called  ‘Universal  reason’.  Studying these issues with a critical 
mind and from a different perspective than the Western philosophers, led Eze60   to contend 
that it is improper  to  claim that philosophy can only come from the West  (by  white  men  
only)  and  not  from  Africa  or  anywhere  else.  Thus Eze’s  conviction  that  philosophy  
should  not  just  be  a cluster  of   fantasies  and  fairy-tales,  but  the  ‘Ordinary  reason’  
which  speaks  to  differential and individuated  histories or “historicized  experiences” that  
are  by  definition  never  similar61   (at  least  in  this  diversified  world). Eze further asserts 
that throughout  human  history   there  has  never  been  a  man   or  a  woman  who  
projected  thoughts  that  were  not tainted  with  the  effects  of  time  (epoch),  surroundings  
(space),  or personal  individuated  experiences (history  or  personal  background)62.  
Overall, Eze is of the view that there  is  an  African  philosophy   and  it  is  a  complete,  
fully  fledged  way  of  thought  which  is  at  the  same  strength  as  that  of  the  West,  
with the  only  difference  being the  expression of  different  experiences 63.  He  suggests  
that  African  philosophy  should  be  accepted  as  such,  because  if  it  were to change  to  
be  like  that  of  the  West,  it  would  no  longer  be  African;  in  fact  it  will  be  an  insult  
to  nature  itself  which  exists  as  the  embodiment  of  diversity64. 
In my view, I see the  reasons  for  Eze’s  thoughts  as being within  his  love  for  philosophy  
itself.  This is because he  makes  it  clear   that  nature  itself  is  diverse, and  the  beauty  
of  that  diversity is in  coexistence65.  However,  proponents and  supporters  of  universal  
                                                          
59 H  Marcuse .1941. Reason  and  Revolution: Hegel  and  The  Rise of  Social  Theory. Oxford 
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 See  also Eze’s “On Reason:  Rationality  in  a  World  of  Cultural  Conflict and  Racism”. In footnote 
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61 Eze (supra 1) 
62 Ibid  
63 ibid 
64 ibid 
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reason may think that Eze  is  merely  reacting against Western  philosophers   because  he  
is  an  African,  or because he  simply  suffers  from  a  desire  to  elevate  the  philosophy  
from  home.   In  addition,  Westerners  themselves  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  Eze  
is  alone   in  these  beliefs,  and  that he  is  just  an  enemy  of   western  truth  (philosophers  
like  Hume,  Kant  and  Hegel).  Nonetheless,  the  reality  is  that  Eze  is  not  alone in  
this  line  of  thought.  Wiredu  wrote  a  whole  chapter  in  his  book66  on  “how  not  to  
compare  African  traditional  thought   with   Western  thought”.  In  this  writing  he  listed  
many  injustices  committed  by  Western  philosophers  when  comparing   African  ways  
of  reason  with  Western  ways  of  reason,  with  the intention  of  belittling systems of  
reason  that  are  different  from  theirs.  He  clearly  mentions  that  a  Westerner  will  be  
biased  in  time  by  taking  traditional,  pre-scientific,  pre-modern  African  thought  and  
comparing it  with  Western  scientific   modern  thought67.  These issues  show that  the  
idea  of  universal  reason  is  prone  to  discard and disregard other  ways  of  thought,  
while  fostering   Western  reason  as  the  only  one.  In  addition  he  clearly indicates  that  
it  is  common  for  Western  philosophers   to  continually  elevate  their  status  and  make  
it  appear as if they that  are  the  best  amongst  all  nations. 
The  defense  of  Eze’s  thought   (philosophy) may  also be presented  using the argument 
that  it  is  reasonable  to  consider  reasoning  as differentially individuated  than being  
universal. From this it is evident that Eze  was and is not a  reactionary at  all,  rather  he  
is  a  lover  of  philosophy  to  the  extent  that  he  deems  it  better  to  protect  it  from  the  
people  who  wanted  to  ridicule  or  even  assassinate  it. I  think  that  African  philosophers  
are  right to   rise  against  the  forces  that  spread  falsehood  or hold the views that there  
is  only  one  way  to  reason,  that is, the  Western  way.  To  say  that  Africa  has  no  
philosophy  or  has  a  philosophy  of  a  lower  value  is  to  deny  the  existence  of  Africans 
in  this  present  world.  If this really were to be or is the  case, then philosophy  will  lose  
meaning  because  it  will  no  longer   be  truthful  in  representing  the  realities of  this 
present  world.  Eze’s thought in challenging Western philosophers is reasonable.  This is 
so because the  presence  of  him  and   his  fellow  African  philosophers  who  challenge  
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this  false  notion  painted  by  Westerners   serves  as   an  enlightenment  and  a  correction 
to  a  mistake  that  would  have  caused  grave  damage  to  philosophy  as  an  important  
element  of  existence.  Following from these perspectives, I am of the view that if  I  were  
one  of  the  Western  philosophers  I  would  not have thought differently though,  but  I  
would  have embraced  the  correction  or  enlightenment  given  by  African  philosophers  
about  their  own  ways  of  reasoning. 
1.2. African thought as Reason 
This  thinking  that  only  the  West  has  a  reason that  is  fit  to  be  branded  philosophy  
is  a  huge  mistake  that would  not  pass  without  correction.  It is worth mentioning here 
that besides  Africans  or  African  philosophers,  some Westerners  also  realized  the  
mistake  made  by  their  great  philosophers.  For  example,  professor  James  Beaty  whom  
David  Hume  referred  to  as  a  “silly  bigoted  fellow”  realized  the  unfairness  and  racial  
insensitivity  in  Hume’s  writing68. However, when  he  spoke  out  trying  to  correct  his  
fellow Western  philosopher  he  reaped  insults,  and  the  various  silly  thoughts  
Westerners  regarded  as  universal would not have been successfully eradicated if  African  
philosophers  themselves  had  kept  quiet  about  it.  According to Zwane,69    “the  fact  
that  an  African  becomes  a  philosopher  (like  Emmanuel  Eze,  Kwasi  Wiredu  and  
other  African  philosophers),  and  pose  serious  thoughts  challenging  the  Western  
philosopher,  in  itself  means  that  there  is  a  philosophical  thought  going  on  in  Africa”. 
Thus Emmanuel  Eze’s ability to challenge the thought  of  Western  philosophers  that  
there  was  never  a  mind  capable  of  producing  philosophy  before (they  did  so)  or  
besides  them  (meaning   thinking  itself  is  their  own  creation), provide a reasonable  
ground for his  arguments.   
Furthermore,   Senzo  Zwane   an  African  writer  advances that  “the  mind  of  a  slave  
is  never free, so  the  product  of  his  will is never  been  seen,  whether  it  is  of  manual  
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strength,  verbal  strength  and  even  mental  strength”70. Zwane further articulates that if 
he  were  to  accept  that Africans  have  never  produced  anything,  nor  any  thought  in  
the  times  of  David  Hume,  Immanuel  Kant  he  would  therefore  propose that both sides 
of such kind of reasoning should be examined.  Zwane in relating what he means in the 
above, explains that the  minds  of  Africans  were  enslaved  and  dictated  over  by  
Westerners,  and  “it  is  not  true  that  they  naturally  could  not  think,  but  it  is  true  
that  their  thinking  capacity  was  tied  up  or  even  stolen  and  used  to  develop  somebody  
else’s  (whom  they  called  Masters  or  Baas).” 
According  to  Henri  Bergson71  “life  itself  is   knowledge  and  consciousness,  for  which  
consciousness  is  reason,”  meaning  that  if  Africans  were  alive  even  before  whites  
(Westerners)  set  foot  on the African soil,  then  it  is  clear  reasoning was always present   
in  Africa. This  is  because the  moment  a  person  starts  living,  experiences  begin,  
history  starts  happening   and  then  thinking  occurs  naturally.  Here  I  try  to  put  more  
emphasis  on  the  fact  that  Emmanuel  Eze  wanted  to  expose  the  factual  reality that  
the  lack  of  knowledge  about  something  does  not necessarily mean  the  absence  or  
non-existence  of  that  particular  thing  (which  the  thought  is  about). For  example,  
Bergson72  Said  “if  I  have  a  thought  that  I  was  never  created  by  God,  that  thought  
on  its  own  does  not  nullify  the  fact  that  I  was  created,  in  fact  it  is  just  a denial  
that  maybe  emanating  from  lack  of  knowledge”.  So,   from   Emmanuel  Eze’s   words  
it  becomes  much  clear  that  it  is  fallacious  to say that  Africans  have  no  thought  or  
philosophy simply  because, as Zwane puts it, “someone  does  not  want  to  believe that  
Africans  or  Negroes  can  think  (in  fact  do  think)  and  produce  wonderful  reasoning  
which  suits  being  categorized  as  philosophy.” 
Moreover,  amongst  Western  philosophers  themselves,  Bergson  is noted for  detailing   
that  “it  is  not  an  account  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  universe  which  claims  to  
be  a  complete  representation  in  knowledge  of  all reality73.  Bergson  understood  that  
                                                          
70 Ibid  
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there  is  no  person  in  the  world  (as  a  whole)  who  possesses  a  capability  to  produce  
a  thought  that  would  be  an  account (in  its  real  and  complete form)  of   the  complete  
nature  of  the  universe and all  realities  that  exist. This  also is  what  Emmanuel  
Chukwudi  Eze  points  out  in  his  writings,  when he underscore that  there  is  no  man  
(in  this  world)  who  contains  the  universal  reasoning  because   all  human  beings  were 
or are  subjective,  not  just  most  of  the  time  but  all  the  time.  Eze further elaborates 
that that the  best  (which  is  the  purest  of  thoughts)  is  that  which  exuberates  from  
within  and  are  presented  as  they  are  revealed  to a  particular  individual,  in  a  way  
understood  by  him  or  her74.  The  original  thought   may  sometimes  be  very  simple  
and  therefore  not  seen  or  even  ignored. Following from this, I therefore think that this 
is what  Henri  Bergson  meant  when  he  said  “its  very  simplicity  was  the  only  reason   
that  had  made  it  possible  to  ignore  it”75.  So,  in my view,  Africans  had  a  philosophy  
even   in  ancient  days,  that is, even  before  the  lives  of  David  Hume,  Immanuel  Kant,  
George Wilhelm Hegel  and  others,   but  the    fact  that  they  never  imposed  it  upon  
any   other  nation  is  the  reason  why it was  ignored  by  Western  philosophers.  In  
addition,  the  proof  or  the  evidence  that  Africa  has  a  philosophy  is  the  fact  that  it  
has  all  that  which is  required  to  intrigue  thought (or  thinking),  things  like  space,  
time  and  history  (which  is  the  series  of  events  taking  place  over  time  period)76 . 
Thus Bergson statement that   reason  is  such  a  thing  that  “the  past  is  gathered  into  
it,  exists  in  it,  is  carried   along  it,  as  it presses  forward  into  the  future”77. 
Looking at the future  that  Bergson  mentions,  I  am bound to believe  that  if  there  was  
not  any  kind  of  reason  whatsoever  in  an  African  mind  then  there  would  have  never  
been  a  continuance  of  Africans  till date,  because  “today  is  yesterday’s  future”  as  
Bergson 78  says.  Therefore, the  fact  that  Africans  still  exist today  is  a  valid  evidence  
that   African  thought  certainly  exists  and  it  bears  a  particular  (or  special)  significance  
in  the  life  of  Africans  at  an  equal  strength   that  the  Western  reason  carries  in  the  
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life  of  a  Westerner.  From all indication, Bergson was firm in his belief that whenever  a  
person  lives  or  exists,  being  affected  by  time  (which  means  still  facing  the  future,  
and  bearing  the  experiences  of  the  past)  there  is  always  a  push  to  reason  because  
the  reality  of  reason  itself  always  manifests  in  every  aspect  of   life  whether  in  the  
West  or  Africa. For him therefore  “out  of  all  things  there  is  one  factor  that  is  never  
able  to  be  doubted”,   even  in  reason  this  factor  is  highly  significant,  and  this  factor  
is  time  itself;  “time  being  one  with  life  and  reality”79. Taking this pronouncement as 
true, it is therefore my submission  that  no  thought of  any world  is to  be  deemed   as  
the  only  thought  or  philosophy  that  exists  to  explain  all  things    (in  this  universe)  
if  indeed  philosophy  still  speaks  of  truth   and  reality.   So it is my view that  whenever  
and  wherever  there  is  a  human  life  there  is   a   philosophy   because   I  indeed  take  
it  to  be  absolutely  true   that  philosophy as stated by  Bergson80  “is  a  transfiguration  
of  what  we  live.”   
1.3. Conclusion 
In  this  chapter  I  illustrated that it is  not  a proper  philosophical  thinking  to  think  that  
philosophy  is  only  from  the  West.  It  is  also  not  right  to  think  that  philosophy  must  
be  a  singular  universal  thing. However, it  should  be  viewed  as  the  presentation  of  
differentially individuated  experiences  according  to  human  differences  in  terms  of  
history  and  other  factors  that  affect  people’s  lives. This  chapter  further  showed  that  
whenever  a  philosopher  writes,  he  writes  his  thoughts  according  to  his  or  her  
experiences,  which  are  in  relation  to  time,  space, and  history. This  has  been  shown  
in  this  chapter  of  this  thesis  by  referring  to  the  writings  of  Hume  and  Kant  who  
philosophized according  to their  experiences,  history,  and  time,  while  thinking  that  
they  were  writing  universal  philosophy.  All  in  all,  this  chapter  demonstrated  that  it  
is  faulty and flawed  to  claim  that  there  is only  one  way  of  reasoning,  which  is  the  
Western. 









Putting the idea of Universal Reason to test 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on putting the idea of universal reason to test. To  be specific,  the 
chapter assesses  the  reasonableness of  dismissing  the  idea  of  universal reason  because 
of the  lack of  knowledge  about  its  manifest  originality. Furthermore, the chapter argues 
that the  idea  of   universal  reason  may  serve  as  a  limitation  to  the  genuineness,  
truthfulness  and  reality  of  human  philosophy  in  this  world.  The  main  aim  of  this  
chapter therefore is  to  state  clearly  the  reasons  why  rejecting  the  universality  of  
reason  sounds  reasonable  than  defending  it. My point of argument then is that rejecting  
this  idea  of  universal  reason  is  equivalent  to  defending  the  life  of  philosophy  itself.   
Amongst  African  philosophers  Eze  is  one  of   those  who uprightly  stood  against the  
notion  that  reason  should be  regarded as  Western  while  tradition  is  regarded  as  
African81.  In  his   objection  to  this  notion  he  wrote  a  book  titled  “On  Reason”  in  
which  he  vividly  argued  against  the  idea  that  there  is  one  Universal  way  of  
philosophical  rationality  or  reasoning. In  this book, Eze  distinctly   argues  that  there  
are  many  ways  of  rationality  or  reasoning  and  it  is  not  good  in  any  way  to  view  
the  Western  way  of  reasoning  as  superior  and  dominant  over  any  other  way  of  
reasoning.  It is my intention in this chapter to  focus  what  Eze’s  book  seeks  to  argue  
and  whether  it  succeeds  or  not. This, I accomplish by  looking  at  how  strong  the  
arguments   are  for  and  against  his views ‘On Reason”. I  also highlight some  
shortcomings  of  ‘one  Universal  Reason’  as  compared   to  the  view  of  ‘relative  
Ordinary  reason’. In this manner, I also explain my reasons for justifying that Eze’s 
argument is convincingly successful. 
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  2.2. Ordinary reason differs from other ways of reason 
At  the  very  beginning  Emmanuel  Eze  starts  by  enumerating  up  to  six  different  
theories  of  reason  which  he  says  are  theories  that  are explicitly  or  implicitly  different  
in ideals or  models  of  rationality.  He lists them as  follows;  “Calculative,  Formal,  
Hermeneutical, Empiricist, Phenomenological,  and  Ordinary  conception  of  
rationality”82.  In explaining these theories, Eze critically examines their functional ways 
and methods, thereby identifying their successes and failures.  Thus, he singles out ordinary 
reason    as the most convincing to him.  Speaking about this form of reason, Eze mentions 
the  times  and  situations  whereby  rationality  becomes  reflectively  ambivalent  to  its  
own  self,  and articulates that this  ambivalence  is  at  the  real  centre  of  experience  
which  should  be  welcomed,  not  rejected.  He  acknowledges  that  Western  philosophers  
have  absolutely  refused to  welcome  this  situation to  the  extent  of  calling  it  ugly  
names  such  as  “clouds  of  darkness”  (writers like Kant83),  gaps.  He  himself  argues  
that  the  possible  grounds  of  this  unavailability  of  self-coincidence  of  reason  with  
itself  in  experience  should  be  welcomed  as  pure  reason, which he refers to it  as  “gap, 
spontaneity, or  autonomy  of  rational”.  He  argues  that  the  open  ended  manifestation  
of  rationality  in  experience  raises  a  need  to  recognise  the  fact  that  there  can  never  
be  an  immaculate,  non-dialectical  conception  of  existence  or  the  way  it  is  represented. 
This  argument by Emmanuel  Eze  speaks  directly  to  the  differences  that  human  beings  
have  due  to  their  environmental  experiences. His  argument  seems  true   because  it  is  
naturally  a  fact  that  nature  presents  itself  differently  to  different  people,  thus  giving  
them  different  experiences  in  different  ways  according  to  where  they  live.  I  find  
the ordinary  conception  of  rationality  being  consistent  with  the  nature  of  the  
presentation  (and  grasping) of  knowledge  in  a  sense  that  we  happen  in  life  to  be  
exposed  to  different  experiences  due  to  the  encounters  that  we  come  across,  and  
sometimes  due  to  a variety  of  environments  in  which  individuals  find  themselves.  
Also,  I  find  Eze’s  argument  successful  in  pointing  out  that  holding  a  view  that  
there  is  only  one  ‘Universal’  way  of  rationality  is  problematic  because  it  raises  
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many  questions  that warrants  to  establish   a  method  that  will be  used  to  prove  its  
superiority  over  any  other  available  rationality that  exists  in  the  world.  Moreover, it  
becomes  clear  that  such  a  way  of  rationality  can  face  difficulties  in  proving  that  it  
speaks  to  all  differentiated  experiences.  
However,  some  may  argue  that  Emmanuel  Eze  only  rejects  the  universal  reason  on  
the  basis  of  his  discontent  with  the  racism  he  encountered with  the  philosophy  of  
David  Hume  and  his   fellow  colleague  Immanuel  Kant.  It is also   without  any  debate, 
clear that  Emmanuel  Eze  feels  really aggrieved   by  the  writings  of  the  philosophers  
who  aggressively  projected  their  racist  views, which he reacted  by  arguing contrarily 
in his own writings. I  find  Eze’s  argument  in  this  particular  book ‘On Reason’  going  
beyond  words  of  anger  or   hatred  of  Western  reason,  or  any  other kind  of  reason.  
For me, Eze’s argument  is  evidence  that  history  and  our imaginations  put  us  into  
experiencing  different  ways  of  rationalising  facts  and  views.  My perspective here is 
based on the fact that it  is  safe to assume  that  if   David  Hume  and  Immanuel  Kant  
happened  had  the  same  experience  as  the  Negros  they  would  have  seen  and  thought  
differently, even  their  interpretation  of  natural  experiences would  have  been  different.  
Therefore,  I  take  Emmanuel  Eze  to  be  reasonably  convincing when  he  says  that  
reasoning  should  be  viewed  as  reflective  to  history  and  experience,  not  as  the  
‘Universal  reason’. 
Eze’s  arguments  in  his  book  portrays  that  rationality  or  reason  as  universal  gives 
rise to  a  number  of  problems which are not only philosophical, but goes beyond   
philosophy to  be  the  unsolvable  quandaries  of  life  at  all  times  or  as  long  as  the  
existence  of  mankind  itself.  The first  problem  that  Eze  mentions  is  that  of  a  method  
of  producing  a  philosophical  thought.  If  one  takes  it  that  there  is  a  universal  way  
of  rationality,  then  there  must  be  a  method  that  should  be  universally  clear  and  
unchangeable  at  all  times. He  demonstrates  that  finding  a  method  is  a  major  problem  
in  itself, as  it  leads  directly  to  the  question  of  who  will  come  up  with  a  method  
that  will  be  able  to  take  into  account  all  the  individuated  life  experiences  of  the  
world.  I find this  a difficult question  to  be  answered  because  it  requires  that  there  
must  be  a  being  not  from  this  world, but  of  different  experiences  and  historical  
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representations; a being  whom  all  philosophers  of  any  region,  at   any  time,  will  
always  be able to  trust. However  this  method  of  philosophising  or  universal  
rationalising   becomes  compounded  when  we  face  the  ordinary  facts  that  we  are  
from  racial  backgrounds that  are  in  themselves  different,  meaning that we are already  
questioning  rationality  differently.   If my reading of  Eze’s  writing  is correct, then it is 
clear that if  we  want  to  universalise  a particular  method  of  rationality, then  there  is  
no other  way than to have  a  ‘thought  dictator’ who will  claim  superiority  and  then  
impose  his  or  her  method  as  better  than  any  other  method  that  exists  in  the  universe. 
Another  significant  fact  in  Eze’s   arguments  about the  method  of  rationalising  is  that  
the  method  itself  should  be  able  to  stand  by  itself,  aside  from  philosophy,. This is 
in the in  a  sense  that  it  must  function  on  itself  to  philosophise  without  changing  
philosophy (as  a  consequent  product).  Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze  makes  it  very  clear  
that  the  method  must  be  the  means  to  the  end,  which  is  to  produce  philosophy  
while  consequently   philosophy  (in  itself)  as  a  product  is  not  tampered  with  or  
affected  in  any way.  I  find  this  to  be  a  greater  challenge  to  anyone  who  feels  like  
arguing  against  this  position, given that the position makes  it  clear  that  such  a  method  
must  be  immutable  whether  due  to  place, time period,  or  experience  from  history,  
and  even  by  environment. In  this  manner  I  am  tempted  to  view  or  think  of  such  a  
method  as  a  device  that can  give  birth  to  a  kind  of  a  philosophy  that  will  be  some 
sort  of  a  revelation,  so  to  say. This is because  it  will  not  be  speaking  to  the  ordinary  
natural  persons  who  have  different  experiences and  histories, but to  persons  who  also  
live  in  different/changing  times  and  places.  There  is  a  major  problem  when  
philosophy  no  longer  talks  to  the  ordinary  realities  or  speak  of  the  reality  as  it  
presents  itself  in  our  ordinary experiences.  In   fact, this could besomething which clearly 
is outside of philosophy.  Besides the  fact  that  I  am  convinced  by  Emmanuel  Eze’s  
refutation  of  the  so-called  ‘Universal  reason’  I  find  his argument successful  owing  
to  the fact  that  no  one  has  ever  thought  of  something  like  a  universal  person  with  
a universal  experience,  or a person who  is  out  of  time  (timeless) and  space. Hence, it  
is  unimaginable  that  something  like  a  universal  method  to  produce  universal  reason  
will  ever  emerge. 
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The above contention, I  put  as a point  of  success  in  Eze’s  reason, and   on  the  basis  
that  in  our  ordinary  human  experience  there  has  never  been  any  person  who  is  
without  race, without  a thought  of  being  in  relation  to   space,  who  is  not  affected  
by  the  period  of  time,  and  who  lives  without  any  influence  of  language.  In  such  a  
case  we  would  also  be  obliged   to  accept  that  we  are  thinking  of  a  philosophy  that  
is  not  of  us,  the  ordinary  persons  in  this  ordinary  world,  or  that  philosophical  
rationality  does  not  speak  to  us. I  take  Emmanuel  Eze‘s  argument  one  step  further  
to  say  that  it  is  the  suppression  of  the  naturally  ‘ordinary  reason’  to  even  think  
that  there  exists  such  a  thing  as  a  ‘universal  reason’.  Also,  to  think  of  finding  a  
universal  method  of  rationalising  that  will  speak  to  all  experiences,  at  all  times,  at  
all  places  and  histories,  is  as  far  from  fulfilment  as it is impossible  in  this  world.  
Maybe  such  a  thing  can  exist  in  the  hereafter  or  in  heaven.  All  in  all, I  submit  
that  Eze’s  argument succeeds  because  I  myself  believe  that  for  one  to  think  of  a  
universal  way  of  reason  he  or  she  must  have  in the first place thought  of  starting  the  
whole existence afresh (in  another  way  or  version  different  from  this  natural  ordinary  
way  that  we  know)  or  the  universe. 
However,  I  understand  that  a  person  who  advocates ‘universal  way  of  reason’  may  
come  to argue  that  since  the  goal  is  to  produce  philosophy,  there  should  be only  
one  way  to  do  so, which should  be  universally  accepted  by  all  those  who  want  to  
philosophise.  Those who speak in this manner usually  take  or  regard ‘formal  reasoning’  
as  the  one  that  qualifies  to  be  regarded  as  a  ‘universal  way  of  reason’.  However,  
I  believe  and am  convinced  that  Emmanuel  Eze  is just  in  disproving  such  thought  
of  a  ‘formal  reason’  as  perfect, always  correct,  and  truthfully  presenting  the  world. 
In my view, Eze is  accurate  when  he  unearths   the  fact  that  it  can  produce  a  
philosophically  sound  argument,  which at same time is  not a  logically  valid  argument, 
because it is lacking  in  terms  of  being  a  philosophically  sound  argument84. For  
example,  saying that (a) All things  that eat grass are goats,  (b) Professor  eats  grass,  then  
conclusion  comes  out  like  (c) Since  all  things  that  eat  grass  are  goats,  and  Professor  
also  eats  grass,  then  he  is  a  goat.  Such  an  argument  under  the method of formal  
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reason  is  valid,  but  it  is  not  true.  Reflecting on this, I turn to  argue  that  such  a  
person  may  be  suffering  from  a lack  of  understanding  that  life  in  itself  is  
multidimensional  and  presents  itself  in  experientially  different ways,  in  different  
places, and  in  different  times  or  periods.  Eze  rightly  shows  that  since  we  can  never  
have  a  way  to  condense  our  differentially  and  individuated  experiences  into  one,  
then  speaking  of  one  universal  reason  is  just  laziness  to  think  beyond  what  is  
known  to  our  own  specific  experience  at  the  same  time. In effect, it is  a  failure  to  
welcome  the diversity  of  the  ordinary  nature  of  reason  itself. 
In  addition,  Emmanuel  Eze  reveals  that  he  has  encountered  failing  philosophies  that  
were  presented  as  universal  and  thought  to  be  beyond  time  limits. In this instance, 
the writings  of  David  Hume  and  his  contemporaries which  include  Emmanuel  Kant, 
comes to mind.  In  fact  David  Hume  in his  essay  titled  ‘Of National Characters” 85 
expressed  many  racist  thoughts, especially in his firm articulations that  Negros  are  
naturally  inferior to  all  other  races (especially  the  white  race).  He  argued  his  racist  
views  aggressively to  the  effect  of  even  trying  to  explain  the  colour  of  Negro  skin, 
stating that  their  blood  contains  much  ‘Phlogiston’. During  his  time,  this  type  of  
thinking  was  clearly  not  found to be false,  because we know today  that  what  he  called  
‘phlogiston’  was  later found  to  be  Oxygen. His  philosophy became  blatantly  and 
completely  false,  or  a  misrepresentation  of  reality  because  there  is  no  blood  that  
has  more  oxygen  than  another  on  the  account  of  race.  I  emphasise  the  words  
‘Naturally  Inferior’  here  because  it  is  the  phrase  that  clearly  depicts  the  idea  of  
Hume’s  thought  that  his  reasoning,  especially  the manner in which he reasoned was  
universal. This is in  the  sense  of his belief that  wherever you  find  a  black  person  you  
will  find  a  being  that  fails  to  produce  a philosophical  reasoning. Furthermore  his  
usage  of  the  word  ‘naturally’  depicts  that  he  was  confident  in  saying  that  blacks  
are  naturally  limited,  not  only  during  that  time  but   at  all  times.  On the other hand, 
Immanuel  Kant  turned  a   blind  eye  to  the  ingenuity  of  a certain  Negro  poet  who  
were  producing  thoughts  that  were never  expected  from  a  negro.  Instead  of  
applauding  him  and  making  corrections  to, or  even  revising  his  misguided thoughts, 
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or  welcoming  the  fact  that  he  discovered   that  a  Negro  can  reason,  he  spoke  
insultingly by likening  the  poet  to  a  bird  that  can  utter few  words  it  has  learnt.  I  
regard  this form   reasoning  as  unfounded and too  much  of  something  like  a  ‘religion’, 
or  a  cult  of  arrogance,  because  it  shows  the  lack  of  ability  to  be  open  to  new  
discoveries.  I say cult  of  arrogance  because such people stick  to  ideas  and  continue  
holding  onto  it,  even  at  the  expense  of  arrogantly  turning  an  ignorant  eye  to  the  
live  evidence  right  in  front  of  their  own  eyes. 
In  this writing  I  argue  that  Eze’s  argument (in  his  book)  succeeds  because  unless  
we  can  establish  one  method  of  rationalising  that  will surely  come  up  with  someone  
who  has  the  (experience, history, language, race  and  so  on)  of  all  human  beings  then  
there  can  never  be  such  a  thing  as  (or  even  qualifying  to  be  referred  to  as)  universal  
reason.  I  vividly  make  this  assertion  because if  ever  in  this  world, we  happen  to  
speak  of  a  universal  reason  without  having  such  a  being  that  possesses  such  qualities 
of  being  existent  beyond  space  and  time,  then  philosophy  will  come  to  nothing  
except  being  a  dead  discipline  that  will  speak  plain  thoughts that  make  no  sense  to  
people  in  the  real  life  or  ordinary  world. Furthermore,  I believe  that  since  knowledge  
itself  is  specific  and  experience  is presented  according  to  a  particular  historical  
background  (historicised  in  terms  of  space  and  era),  and    affected  by  the  
environment, it  should  be  satisfactory  to  admit  that  we  ordinary  natural  human  beings  
do  not  have  the  tools  that  are  sufficient  enough to  enable  philosophers  to  reach  
what  can  be  wisely   known  as  the  ‘universal  method  of  rationalising’. It is for this 
reason that I  argue  that Eze  succeeded,  because  it  is  in  reality perceivable  that  once  
someone   thinks  of  such  a  thing  as  the  universal  reason,  there  is  no  way  such  a  
person  would  do  so  except  as  a  racist,  self-imposing,  thought  dictator,  and    a being  
ignorant  of  the  change  in  times –, including  the  unwillingness  to  change  or  to  speak  
directly  to  matters of reality. 
However,  someone  who  is  a  critic  of  this  objection  of  the  ‘universal  reason’  would  
argue  that  there  can  be  a  universally  acceptable way  or  even, seemingly, a  more  
appealing  way  of  reasoning,  seeing that  philosophy is supposed to  be  philosophy  (in  
one  way)  everywhere,  and  at  all  times. In  this  case,  I simply  respond  (in  a  way  I  
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think  Emmanuel  Eze  himself  would  respond) by  saying that,  the  fact  that  something  
is  accepted  does  not  make  it  the  truth  or  truly  correct. I  argue thus  because  there  
are  many  reasons  that  could  make  something  acceptable,  one  of  them  is  in  the  case  
where  there  are  no  known  alternatives,   another  is  the case  where it  is  pushed  by  
the  powerful  to  the  powerless until they, the weak  ones,  have  no  choice  but  to  accept  
it. Another case would be where  it  is  most  easily reachable  to  every person  everywhere  
at  any  time.  In my view therefore,  reason  does  not  fall  into  any  category  of  such  
ways  of  compulsion  to  be  universally  accepted,  and to be  called  ‘universal  reason’.  
Moreover,  by  saying  that  it  is  appealing,  there  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  gap  opened 
there  for  questions  such as;  who it  is  appealing  to    exactly; is  it  to  a  particular  self-
chosen  group, race, language  group,  power  of  resource  class; and  on  what  authority  
or  might  does  that  being  or  group  of  beings  possess  or contain (in  all)  over  the  
whole  universe?  Eze himself  is  a  good  example  that  the  universal  acceptability  of  
something  called  ‘universal  reason’ begs  a  question; time  and  (epistemologically) 
knowledge. In  the  sense  that  due  to  knowledge  limitations  at  that  time  something  
might  seem  acceptable  today  or  in  this  era,  but,  when  lot  of  new  things  come  and  
knowledge  increases or  unfolds  to  other  realities  then  that  very  same  thing  may  no  
longer  be  acceptable.  
Eze  suggests  that  it  is  safer  to keep  things  as  ordinary  and  natural  as  they  are.  
Ways  of  reasoning  should be  kept  as  diverse  as  they  ordinarily  are, and  this  in  my 
view is the  only  way  to  allow  philosophy  to  flourish, or  even  evolve because  it  is  
consistent  with  the  realities  of  the real  world without  changing it  to  something  else.  
To  make  an  example  that  will  prove  that  reason  has  something  to  do  with  the  time  
or  era in  which  it  is  produced, I  can  simply  refer  to  the  fact  that  we  now  speak  of  
living  in  the  era  of  postcolonial, post-racial, or modern and  so on.  Therefore  it  is  clear  
that  the  thoughts  during  previous  times  of  slavery,  racial era, colonial or pre-colonial  
era  would  never  be  the  same,  or  even  follow  the  same  trend  as  the  current  thought86. 
In  fact  I  think  Emmanuel  Eze  would  not  hesitate  to  say  that  even  if  the  reason  of  
that  time  and  events  of  those  times  would  be  presented  to  us  now,  we  would  have  
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our  own  understanding  and  interpretations  of them, otherwise  we  would  make  up  
some  assumptions.  But  the  fact  remains  that  we  cannot  reason  in  the  same  way  as  
a  person  of that  time who  has  the  experience  of  that  time  would  reason. Another  
evident  example  that  can  easily  be  seen  is  that  of  the racist  and  colonial  philosophy  
of  David  Hume  and  Immanuel  Kant. At  that  time  it  was  reasonable  to  think  like  
that, having  the  same  experience as  they  had,  but  nowadays  those  kinds  of  thoughts  
have  expired,  in  fact,  the  very  essence  of  that reason  has  been  exposed as a  first 
hand falsehood. 
In  addition, Eze  probes further by considering  the  issue  of  the  language  in  which  a  
person  thinks  or  projects  his  or  her  thoughts  as  an  element  that  contributes  to the  
way  of  philosophising  or  presenting  ones  way  of  reasoning.  This  happens  to  be  
noticeable  where  some  philosophers  project  their  views  in  a  certain  way  and  are 
understood  better  by  certain  people or  are  understood  differently, and interpreted  in  
ways  that  are  contradictory due  to  the  way  the language  is  used. However,  I understand  
that  this  may  be  viewed  as  a  minor  issue  by  some  people, particularly  those  during 
colonisation  and  slavery,  who had an  upper  hand  in accessing  tools  that enabled  them  
to  project  their  thoughts  clearly  as  they  wanted  and  intended  them  to  be.  I  find  
Emmanuel  Eze as being on point  when  he  speaks  of  language  as  a  part  of  existence,  
because  language evidently  plays  a  vital  role  in  the way  people  produce  and  present  
their  thoughts;  it  can  produce  some  originality of  meaning especially  when  we  are  
concerned  with  genuineness of  thought. Eze  gives an  example  of  other  philosophers  
like  Kafka87  who  classically   produced  their  philosophical  work  in  a  foreign or  
colonial  settlers’ language. Thus he argues that they  sometimes  encounter  difficulties  to  
the  extent  that  they  are   forced  to  bend  the  language  in  a  way  that  it  adopts  either  
some  vocabulary  or  tune  which  will  help  their  expressions  to  fit    their  home tongue.  
I  must  admit  that  in  most  cases, and  for  most  people,  it  seems  to  be  a  long  process  
to  translate  their  thoughts  before  projecting  them,  while  if  one  was  to  think  in  his  
home  language  it  would  be  easy  to  express  all  the  thoughts  without  fear  or  even  
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distortion  of  presentation  within  oneself. To  be  forthright,  I  am  one  of  those  who  
believe  that  language  is  more  than  just  words,  it  has  a  deeper  meaning  than  what  
we  may  read  in  papers.  For  example  each  and  every  language  has  its own  way  of 
speaking and  presenting, and  this  may  be  clearly  seen  if  one  translates  from  one  
language  to  another. In the  process of such translation,  the  original  expressions or  the  
depth of the feelings and spirit is  lost, and sometimes  even  the  interest  that it  had  in  
its  original  form is also lost. Having  said this,  I  believe that  the  underlying  fact  is  that  
language  itself  contains  tools  to  guide  a  person’s   thoughts  or  thoughts  presentation  
in a  certain  way,  and  it  is  a  sure  fact  that  when  one  expresses  their  thoughts  in  a  
foreign  tongue  then  he/she follows the  rules  of  that  particular  language.  This  happens 
to  the  extent  that  a  person’s  words  may  even lose  gravity while  the other  is  still  
thinking of  how  to  say  it.  Once this is understood, it  becomes  clear  why the 
philosophers  whom  Emmanuel  Eze  talks about  ended  up  breaking rules  of  the  
language  in  attempts  to  project  their  views. and  by so  doing, they tried  to  shy  away  
from  language  limitations. In my view, they had no choice. However, if  they  really  
wanted  to  produce  their  own  thoughts  from  their  own  experiences,  they  had to  break  
language  boundaries, which means not everything in their reason would have been 
expressed because of the such language barrier. . So,  if  language  itself  does  not  permit  
universality  then  it  becomes  very  hard  to  envisage the universal  reason,  as  Wa 
Thiango’o spoke of decolonising the mind88. Following from these, I  argue  that  having  
these truth  before  us  is  evidence  enough to  prove  the  success  of  Eze’s  argument. 
However, it  is  perceivable  that  defenders  of  this  idea  of  universal  reason  may  raise  
the  issue  of  globalisation.  A  person  may  say  globalisation    is  the  idea  of  shrinking  
the  world  into  a  small  universal village, in  which  things  happening  on  one  side  of 
the  world  can  quickly  be  known  throughout  the  universe  within  minutes89.  Well, in 
my reasoning, I would maintain that if  someone  at any point in time  argued  for the 
possibility of the existence of the idea of  universal  reason  as being more satisfactory  over  
the  position  for which  I  argue, then  I  would  contend  that  the particular  person in 
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question clearly  misunderstands  my  concern. I  believe  that  there  is  a  complete  
difference  between  the  overspread  of  knowledge or  information,  and  the  reasoning  
in  experience and historicised  reality.  The  difference  is  that  information  can  be  spread  
and  be  globalised  or  universalised  but  experience  is  always  specific  and  cannot  be  
universal  in  any way  because  experience  is  lived and  therefore  it  goes  deeper and  
beyond  being  near  us. Experience for me is a kind of life within us. Moreover,  the  
globalisation  of  information  does  not  mean  a  similar  way  of  understanding  and  
presenting  information. Besides, information can be digested in different ways to mean 
different things.   
2.3. Reasons for rejecting the idea of universal reason  
There  are  serious  things  that  cannot  be  ignored  when  dealing  with  special and  
thought  demanding  topics.  According to Bankowski  and  MaClean, in “any  writing  or  
study  of  a  particular  subject  it  is  always  wrong  to  take  things  at  a  higher  level  
without  looking  at  the  root  foundations.” 90 I  think  they  were  right  because  things  
could  easily  be  admitted  or  rejected  unfairly  if  they  are  not  properly  addressed  at  
their  basic  level.  So,  even  the  idea  of  universal  reason  needs  to  be  rightly  
investigated  from  its  basic  roots,  because  there  are  factors  that it must be grounded 
on, if  ever  it  were  to  exist  in  this  natural  world.  So, taking into account  Western  
philosophers  perception that  Negroes  cannot  reason,   is a view which on its own makes 
it difficult  to  reach  a  conclusion that  there  will  ever  exist  something  called  or  worthy  
to  be  termed  universal  reason. This claim is based on the fact that  if  one  pays  sufficient  
attention  to  the  claims   of  Western  philosophers  then  it  is  very  clear  that the branding 
of their  thought as ‘universal  reason’  would be a disregard to  those  nations  like  
Negroes/Africans  and  others  who  were  declared  not  white  enough  to  have  the ability  
to  produce  philosophy.  
The  idea  of  universal  reason  needs   some  factors  to  have  preceded  it.  The  first  
among  them  is  that  there  needs  primarily  to  be in existence  some  entity  that  fits  the 
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description of ‘a  universal  person’ with  a  universal  mind.  By  universal  mind,  I am 
referring  to  the  universal  experiences  and  thoughts  that  encompass  the  whole  of  this  
world  at  all  times,  till  eternity. In  this  context,  eternity  means  that  such  a  being  
must  in  his  reasoning   encompass  all  historicized  experiences  of  the  world  in  all  
times  (past,  present,  and  the  future)91. It is  clear  then  that  such  a  being  must  have  
never  lived  as  an  individual  because  if  he/ she/ they have  ever  existed  in  a  form  of  
individuated  thinking  entities,  then  it  is  not  clear  how  their  particular  historicised  
reason will  transform  into  being  universal. 
Another  challenge  is,  if  that  kind  of  reasoning – universal  reason – will  be  produced  
by  particular  persons  who  possess  individuated  and  historicised  experiences,  then  it  
seems  that  there  must  be  a  judge  to  rate  those  thoughts  for  their  universal  worthiness.  
This further means that the  judge  or  judges  has to  be  a  being,  whose  knowledge  and  
experience  encompass  the  whole  world  beyond  space, time,  and  history;  or  to  make  
matters  less  problematic,  they  must  have  a  universal  special  element  to  measure  the  
universal worthiness  of  all  thoughts  that  are  being  produced  and  claimed  to  be  
universal92.  Also,  if  one  considers  this  idea  carefully,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  
problem  gets  more deeper  because  it  does  not  get  any  clearer  how such a  universal  
person  comes  about. It also becomes  a  problem  when  we  think  about   universal  reason  
measuring  element  or  sort  of  machine.  I  also  submit  that  even  if  a special  machine  
for  testing  thoughts  could  be  designed, there  still  can  be  inaccuracies   made  by  
someone  (or  individuals)   from  somewhere,  who  is  affected  by  time,  space,  and  
history, which are the individualised  and  historicised  experiences.  Taking these into 
consideration, it  becomes  even more  clear   that  the  idea  of  universal  reason  sounds  
more  futile  and  totally  unsatisfactory  to  be  reasonably  accepted. 
Another  serious   factor  that  needs  to  be  ignored in this discussion is  the  fact  that  
“reason  should  be  truthful  and  more  real  to  the  human  beings  of  this  world”93.  But 
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if  philosophers  start  to  focus  on  such  things  as  universalising  their  thought, then 
there  is  a  growing  fear  that  philosophy  will  no  longer  be  truthful  to  individuated  
lives. This means that the  universal  reason,  to  the  particular,  and  ordinary  persons  
will  be  absolutely  useless  or  even  irrelevant  because  truths  that  directly  resonate  
with  them will not be revealed.  The  focal point here  is  that  “the  universe  itself  can  
be  viewed  by  different  people  in  different  perspectives”,  meaning  that  even  if  one  
person  emerges  somewhere  with  a  credible  thought  qualifying  it  to  be  regarded  as  
universal  thought,  it  is  most  likely  to  face   many  challenges94.  In addition, 
philosophers themselves rarely agree on anything. Therefore, it  is  explicitly  clear  that  
any thoughts on the acceptance  of  the  idea   of  universal  reason  as  a  significant  
possibility  is  unnecessary  and  not  promising  to  yield  any  profit95.  Further,  it  is  a  
significant  recognition  that  human  beings  are  unique  (in  a  sense   that  any  person  is  
unique  from  one  another)  and  limited  in  their  capabilities96.  Having  acknowledged  
fact therefore  leads  every  thinker  to  the  recognition  that  trying  to  unify all  kinds of  
thoughts   into  one  singular  kind  of  reason  called  ‘universal  reason’  is  just  an  
unnecessary  effort  to  destroy  the  potency  of  philosophy  or  reason  itself.  It  is  then  
difficult to  imagine  one  kind  of  reason  being  taken  to  mean  the  whole  world,  
anywhere,  at  all  times,  and  encompassing  all  sorts  of  human  experiences.  At  the  
same  time  it  is  problematic  trying to  imagine  a  kind  of  reason  in  this  world  of  
particularly  individuated  and  historicised  experiences that  does  not  (at  all)  speak  to  
those  differentially  particularised  experiences,  but  only  claims  to  be  a  universal  
reason. According to Bergson,97  “for  any  kind  of  reason or  philosophy  to  have  value,  
or  support  life  and  existence ,  it  should  speak  truthfully  to  the  real  conditions  that  
humans  face  as   naturally  particular  individuals”.  If   someone  takes  these  words  
seriously  it  becomes  quite evident that  reason  is  naturally  differentiated,  and  if  any  
person  from  any  part  of  the  world  attempts  to  unify  it  or  rise  above  its  variations  
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then  that  certain  being  would  be  eliminating  philosophy  or  reason  itself  in  this  
natural  world. 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I  attempted   to  present  my  position  on  Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze’s  
argument about reason. I argued against the idea of universal reason, while  in  the  process  
suggesting  that  there  are  many  ways  of  reason.  I  did  so  by  critically examining  the  
satisfactoriness  or  the  success  of  this  position,  considering  reason  to  be  rationally  
specific  in  terms  of  place,  and  time,  and  (historicised)  experience. While I posited 
arguments  that  could be made in  favour  of  universal  reason, I also  established that  
they  do  not  defeat  the  strength  of  Eze’s  argument  against  the very idea  of  a  universal  
reason. Given  the  strength  and  confidence  of  Eze’s  argument  against the  possibility  
of  the  universal  reason,  I proceeded  to elucidating  that  there  will  never  be  such  a  
thing  as  a  ‘universal  reason’ because  it  is  unimaginable  that  mankind  will  ever  
condense  and  be  one  in  all  aspects.  If  such an occurrence should  happen,  it  would  
enable  mankind  to  come  up  with  one  universal  method  of  philosophical  reasoning 
as a  bridge  to embrace  this form of reasoning. Therefore, my point of contention in this 
chapter was  that Eze  succeeded  in  this  position  (of  many  ways  of  reason)  not  simply  
because  it  is  appealing  to  me,  but  also  because  it  is  representing  of the  ordinary  
truth  as  it  is  in  the  real  world   of  experience.  However, some people may have 
differing views from Eze’s and mine, which speaks for the idea of universal reason. So in 





The challenges posed to counter Eze’s disclaimer of Universal Reason 
3.1. Introduction 
This   chapter    specifically  discusses  various  challenges  that  may  be  posed to  counter   
Eze’s  repudiation   of  Universal  reason. It  brings to the fore  those  arguments  that  can  
be  presented  by  the  supporters  of  the idea  of  universal  reason   and  shows  how  they  
can  be  overcome. While this chapter deals  with  some  crucial  challenges  that  can  be  
tabled  against  Eze’s  dismissal  of  Universal  reason,   the  idea  of  the  Ordinary  reason  
is also  critiqued. The  aim  of  critiquing  ordinary  reason  is  to  show  that  it  is  the  
better  and  more  reasonable  option  than  universal  reason. At the  end  of  this  chapter, 
I vividly contend that  the arguments and perspectives for ordinary  reason  thrives   over  
that  of universal  reason. 
3.2. Universality as argued in political terms 
People  in  different  parts  of  the  world  have  experienced  democracy  and  what  they  
call  globalisation  in  this  modern  world.  That  experience  makes  them  think  that  
universal  reason  has  the  potential  of  coming  into existence  and  acceptability.  By  
definition,  democracy  is  the  ability  of  people  to  be  open  about  what  they  like,  what  
they  are, who  they  want  to  rule   over  them,  and  what  they  want  to  be  known  about   
them   and  so  forth98.   Zwane99   gives  a  political  definition  of  this  term  to mean  that  
citizens  of  a  particular  state  now  have  a  list   of   rights which  includes  the  right  to  
have  a  government  that  is  chosen   or  elected  by  the  majority  in  their  own  freewill.  
The  concept  of  democracy  has  made  many  citizens  in many  different  states  of  the  
world  want  to  exercise  their freedom. It has as well led them  towards chances of getting  
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together  and  pursuing  one  goal  called  “Human  Rights   and  Freedom”100.   From  the  
concept  of  democracy,  developed   the  process  called  ‘globalisation’,   which  Mayo101 
has  explains to mean “the  process  whereby  the  whole  world  gets  to  function  as  one  
global  village,  to  pursue  one  particular  goal,  whether  politically  or  economically”.  
However  some  defenders  of  universal  reason  may  argue  that  if  the  world  with  
different  cultures,  traditions,  backgrounds  and  so  on,  can  all  be  incorporated  in  that  
concept  or  process  of  globalisation  then  why  it  is  hard  to  see  that   in   the  same   
way,   thought  can  be  universalised.    Democracy indeed  has   become  global  nowadays  
and  the  concept  of  globalisation  has  become  universally  popular. Therefore,   a  person  
raising  this  view  may  not  be  regarded  as  totally  off-topic  on  this  issue  of  
universalisation  of  thought,  though  there  are  things  that  such  a  person  could  be  
missing. 
Taking   from the definition of  universal  reason  as  provided by Eze102 to mean the  system  
of  reason  that  goes  beyond  time, era, race,  space,  and  history,   it  becomes  clear  that  
the  use  of  the  concept  is  specific  and  not  to  be  compared  with  other  concepts.  This  
is  because  globalisation  is  a  process  that  is  exercised  within  a  specific  time  and  
democracy  itself  is  differentially  practised  in  different  places  according  to  the  change  
of  times103.  Those  who  think  reason  can  be  universal  are  missing  something  very  
important, which is that   nature  itself  is  made  of  differences.  Samir  Amin104 in his 
writings postulate that  “globalisation  of  interests  differ  from  time  to  time; in  different  
places  there is  need  to  globalise  political  strategies, while in other  places  there is need 
to globalise economics because  of  changing times  and  history”.  From this, it is apparent 
that globalisation  does  not in itself mean  becoming  one  thing (singularity),  but  it  means  
the  coming   together  of  many  things  in  the  world,  and  it  is  not  aloof  from  the  
effect  of  time,  place,  and  history.  The same  applies  with   reasoning,  it   is  always  
                                                          
100 J Painter .2008. Counter hegemonic news: A case study of Aljazeera. [Online], available from 
<reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk> 
101 Mayo (supra 105) 
102 Eze (supra 1) 
103 J.N Pieterse.  2001. Unpacking globalization. In P. Hamel, H Lustigerthaler, J.N Pieterse and S. 
Roseneil (eds). Globalization and Social Movements. Palgrave  Publishers  Ltd. P  22- 23 
104 S  Amin .1980. The theory of Imperialism and the Contemporary Crisis. Class and Nation, 
Historically and in  Current  Crisis.  Monthly Review Press.  Pp 225 -228 
36 
 
affected  by  time, space,  and  history, meaning that it will  always  be  differentiated  in  
the  same  way  democracy  and  globalisation  mean  different  things  in  different  places,  
in  different  times,  and  in  relation  to  a  particular  history.  Given this, I  suggest  that  
since  globalisation  and  democracy  mean  different  things  in  different  places  according  
to  time  and  history,  but  still  remain  the  same  democracy  or  globalisation, implies 
that  there  must  be  nothing  difficult  with  accepting  that  there  are  different  ways  of  
thought  influenced  by  time,  space,  and  history, and all  qualify  to  be  under  one  term  
‘reason’.  Globalisation  may  be  interpreted   to  mean  the  accommodation  of  all  
differentiated  cultures  and  practices  for  the benefit  of  all  mankind. The same  applies  
to  democracy which voices out all  individuals’  historicised  experiences  and  desires, 
and does  not  universally  unified  things  like  the  idea  of  universal  reason.    
Another  point  to  be  taken  into  account  by  those  who  argue  for  the  idea  of  the  
universal  reason  under  this  line  of  argument  is that democracy  and  globalisation  have  
created  a  number  of  challenges  in  this  world. Democracy  itself  has  come  with  the  
problem  of  leadership  in some parts  of  the  world,  especially  in  non-Western  countries,   
and  the  reason  is  that  it  was  pushed  by Westerners  with  certain  self-interests  for  
their own  advantage105.  The fact of it being  pushed  to  all  people  as  the  acclaimed  
universal  system, caused  many  clashes  in  different  places,  because  in  nature  this  
modern  democracy  is  more  Western so much so that it evencauses  political  instability  
in  governments  of  some  places106.  My argument in this thesis is that  the  idea  of  
universal  reason  will  not  be  acceptable  anywhere  at  any  time in  philosophy that is 
produced  by  intellectually  honest  people because it is more  likely  to  cause  more  
problems  than  it  can  solve.  Gamal Abdullah107  argues that  “globalisation   and  
democracy  that  does  not  speak  to  people’s  individuated  cultural  differences  and 
particular  experiences,  is  just  a  form  of  a  diplomatic  exclusion  of  others”.  These  
words  highlight  the  fact  that  the  kind  of  reasoning  that  accounts  for  universal  
persons  are apart  from  those of   natural  persons who  have  individuated  and  historicised  
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experiences.  Adding to this,  I  argue  that  inventing  things  that  lack  feasibility  in  
relation  to  the  ordinary  persons  of  this  world  must  not  be  taken  seriously. Hence,  
the  idea  of  universal  reason  lacks  feasibility  because  a  universal  person  has never  
existed  and  it  is  not  clear  how  it shall  accommodate  the  natural,  individuated  and  
historicised experiences  of  the  ordinary  human  beings  in  this  world. 
3.2.1 The challenge of mathematics as universal 
Another  challenge  that  may  be  brought  forth  against  the  dismissal  of  the   universal  
reason  is  that  some  of  the  best  known  philosophers  were  also the best  mathematician 
who  produced universal mathematics108. So  if  mathematics  has  been  invented  by  
individual  philosophers  who  lived  in  a  particular  era,  a particular geographical  space,  
having  experienced things  in  their  historical  backgrounds,  then  it  should  not  be  
unthinkable  that  they  can  successfully devise  some  kind  of  reasoning  that  will have  
that  innate  universality.  Indeed  it  is  a  universally  creditable  truth  that  some  of  the  
best  mathematicians  were  philosophers, and  some  of the best  philosophers  were  also  
mathematicians,  and  mathematics  is  undoubtedly  a  universal  subject.  Mathematics  
contains  universal  rules  that  apply  always  beyond  time  limits,  beyond  space  limits,  
and  even  regardless  of  who  one is or  what   experiences  one has.  However,  according 
to Davis  and  Hersh,109  “the  point   to  highlight  concerning  mathematics  and  
calculations  is  that  they  are  rigid,  and  mathematics  speaks  to  constant  variables  or  
solid  empirical  facts   which  are  just  the  way  they  are,  and  they  dictate  on  anyone   
to  see  them  in  one  dimension”.    Vico110  mentions  that  “it  is  never  the  case  in  any  
world  that   1+1 =3  regardless  of  who  does  the  calculations. However,  it  is  known  
that  whenever  we  deal  with  mathematics and apply the rules,  we  end  up  in  one  
conclusion”.  In  this  study, I  acknowledge  that  this  challenge  is  quite  creditable,  
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although  it  still  shows  some  grey  areas  as  far  as  the  idea  of  universal  reason  is  
concerned. 
This  argument  of  mathematics  being  universal  sounds  quite  creditable,  but if  one  
looks  carefully,  there  is  more  to  it  than  it  appears.  Firstly, mathematics deals with or 
represents    empirical facts.  Therefore,  I  put  forward  that   it  does  not  speak  to  all  
facts  (especially  those  kind  of  things  that  include  experiences  of  individuals’  histories  
and  so  forth)111.  This  is  because  “mathematics  has  got  its  rules  that  were  formulated  
to  apply  everywhere  in  the  same  way  to  get  similar  results,  otherwise  it  changes  
to  be  something  else,  or  another  kind  of  mathematics”  as  Vico112 puts  it.   In  saying  
this  I  attempt  to  put  forward  that  subjects  like  physical  sciences and  mathematics  
have  rules  that  were  put  in  place  to  be  used. It  is  right  for  those  empirical  subjects  
to  have  such  rules  and  be  treated  (everywhere)  in  that  manner  because  they  are  not  
concerned  with  the  human’s  particular  and  individually  historicised  experiences  like  
thought  does.  In  addition,  I  think  that  Horkheimer113 was  accurate    when  he   said  
“never  change  what  works   and  seek  that  which  you  do  not  know,  because  in  
pursuit  of  what  you  hope  for  you  may  destroy  the  functional  present  one”.  I  take  
these  words  seriously  because  they  acknowledge  the  fact  that  all  over  the  years  
reason  has  been  used,  it  always  existed  as  the  projection  of  individually  historicised  
experiences   in  this  ordinary  world,  subject  to  time,  place,  and  history.  To  be  honest,  
it  must  be clearly stated  that  putting  rules  in  philosophical  reasoning  like  in  
mathematics  may  be  destructive  than  being  constructive. This is  because  people  will  
no  longer   be  able  to  express  their  ordinary   experiences   in  exactly  the  same  way  
they  would  do  if  they  were  untrammeled  with  a  list  of  rules  and  regulations.   
According to Mayo,114“when  something  is  like  mathematics,  calculus, Algebra,  or  
Geometry,  it  is  regulated  to  produce  desired  outcomes,  and  there is  no  freedom  or  
debate  about  that”.  To  me  this  sounds  more  of  a  truthful  statement  because  even  
in  mathematics, one  cannot  apply  [any]  rules   of   Geometry  in  Algebra  or  Calculus  
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(and  other  kinds  of  maths).  However,  there  are  specific  laws  to  be  complied  with  
in  every  sphere,  and  those  laws  always  determine  the  outcome. 
Furthermore,  physical  sciences  and  mathematics  are  not  much  like  philosophy  because  
they  speak  of  empirical  things  that  have  particular  (empirical)  ways  to  be  viewed  
and  known115.  This  point  leads  the  argument  back  to  the  ‘truthfulness  and  liberty  
in  thought’  issue,  because  everyone  from  any  part  of  the  world  should  be  able  to  
produce  their  thought  truthfully  and  ordinarily  as  it  emerges  from  them. Likewise, 
everyone  should  be  completely  able  to  do produce  their thought  truthfully  and  
ordinarily without  fear  of  being  limited  by  so-called  ‘rules  of  universal  reason’.  I  
think  it  should  be  clear  that  ordinary  beings  will  always  benefit from  ordinary  things  
that  speak  directly  to  them. This is because rules  and  regulations  that  have  never  
proved  to  be  necessary  over  the  history  of  human  nature  will  simply  bring   radically  
destructive  and  unnecessary  problems  accompanied  by  difficulties  in  thought  itself.  
Moreover,  when  Emmanuel  Eze  writes  about  reason116  he  talks  about  something  that  
is   part  and  parcel  of  mankind,  something  that  emanates  from  the  inside. Having  it  
regulated  by  universality  rules  that  are  built  from  the outside will  surely  count  as  a  
forceful   dictatorship  to  abandon   that  naturalness  of  being  of a  particular  individual  
with  ordinary  and  historicised  experiences.  At   least  for  mathematics  it  is  clear   that  
some  beings  or  individuals  saw  some  of the world’s  presentations  in  one  singular  
form. This is because the world’s presentations were  empirical  and formulated  laws  that  
limit  even  the  ability  to  consider  those  things  otherwise.   This  I  would  call  
dictatorship  by  those  who  were  there  at  the  time  of  invention  or  discovery.  However  
for  philosophy  and  reasoning  at  large,  people  viewed and presented as   individually  
different  with  different  views  about  this  ordinary  world  due  to  their  particularly  
historicised  experiences. As such, this  brings about  the  fear  of  thought   imperialism  
when  people  talk  about  this  concept  of  universal   reason. 
Another  challenge  that  a  person  may  raise  is  that  if  all  people  are  rational  beings  
then  it  must  also  come  to  mind  that  they  can  reason  or  use  their  rationality  until  
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they  reach  the  bottom  as  one  reason,  which  then  would  be  the  ‘universal  reason’.  
Wiredu117 stated  that  “humans  are  all  rational  and  if  they  put  all  their  energy  of  
thought  together  they  can  be  very  productive  in  a  deep  sense  because  at  the  end,  
they  are  one  in  being the  citizens  of  this  universe”.  The  fact  that  all  existing  human  
beings  are  thinking  ‘dwellers’  of  this  universe  sounds  good  to  the  effect  that  other  
minds  can  be  tempted  to  think  that  even  in  thought   all  people  view  and  experience  
things  the  same.  I  think  there  is  nothing  completely  wrong  in  thinking   and  hoping  
that  people  will  one  day  reach  oneness  when  they  have  reached  that  “bottom  of  
reason” as Wiredu118 says,  even though  there  are  issues  with  such  kind  of  thinking.   
The  first  issue  is how  long  shall  philosophers  work  to   reach  at  that  bottom  of  
reason  and  how  much  time  do  they  have  available  to  play   around  looking  for  
something  that  has  never  worked?  The  second  issue  is  about  who  will make the 
declaration to say thinkers  have  reached  the  ‘bottom  of  reason’,  given that  it  is  not 
at  all  clear  why  abandoning  the  ordinary  reason  would  sound  better  in  the  ordinary  
minds  of  the  ordinary  people,  while  they  do  not  abandon  their  nature  of  being  
ordinary  (affected  by  issues  of  time, space,  and  history).  I  think therefore that  it  
should  be  troubling   and  be  a  matter  of  concern   how  that   kind  of  reasoning  would 
look,  and  in  what  condition  the  person  who  will  be  responsible  for  the  successful  
production  of  such  reason will be.  How  shall  that  particular  philosopher  connect  
himself with  a kind  of  reasoning  that  is  above  all  human  experience. I  think  that  
such  an  idea  as  the  idea  of  universal  reason  sounds  more  like  an  attempt  to  take  
a  bigger  step  towards  the  assassination  of  ordinary  human  reason  in  this  ordinary  
world. 
Another  way  that  a person  may  look  at  this  argument  for  the  rejection  of  universal  
reason  is  to  firstly  look  at  the  facts  about  human  beings  that  exist  in  the  world.   
Theodore  and  Hudson119  stated  that  “among  the  qualities  of  human  beings  that  live  
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in  this  world  is  the fact that they are  limited  in  terms  of  time [era  that in  which  they  
live], environmental  factors  and  history  attached  to  that”.  When  I  consider  carefully  
that   all  humans  are  rational  beings  it  does  not  follow  that  they  have  to  rationalise  
in  one  way  and  then  produce  what  will  be  known  as  ‘universal  reason’, it  simply  
means  that  they  all  have  been endowed  with  the  capability and  ability  to  reason.  
Above  all,  I  assert   that   reason  has  always  been used  as  an  ordinary  reason  and  it  
has  been  usefully  functional  in  terms  of  resonating  with  the  people  in  this  world.  
I  think the  idea  of  the  production  of  universal  reason  should  not  be  acceptable  to  
any  thinker  who  just   faces  the  facts  and  admits  that  the  world  or  the  universe  
presents  itself  to  the  human   mind  in  different  ways  according  to  difference  in  time  
(epoch),  place,  and  individually  historicised  experiences. This is  because  the  very  
existence  of  that  idea  is  to  undermine  all  those  factors  involved  in  reason.   The  
whole  idea   of  universal  reason  stems from  the  fact  that  some  people  think  that  they   
are   limitless  or can rise  above  natural  limits. While  they  have  no  capability  to  do  
so, then  the  whole  idea  of  universalising   thought  is  just a vain  and  exaggerated  
appreciation  of  the  fact  that  humans  can  invent  wonderful  things.  According to 
Reign,120 “too much of anything is a problem”. This means that even too  much  of  
ambitions,  dreams   and  visions  can  also be  detrimental  rather than  progressive,  and  
the  idea  of  universal  reason  upon  non-Universal  individuals  in  the  ordinary  world  
is  just  too  much  hope  and  overestimation  of  human  capability. 
Some  supporters  of  universal  reason  may  argue  that  dismissing  the  idea  of  universal  
reason  emanates  from  the  phobia  against  the  invention  of  new  things.  Gamal121 
argued  that  “normally  when  people  see or  hear  about   a  new  thing  that  they  have 
never  heard  of  before,  they  react  commonly  with  criticisms  due  to  fear”.  Fear  as  a  
feeling  should  be  respected  and  be  controlled,  but  sometimes  it  is  reasonable  to  
verify  before  claiming  that  someone  speaks  things  due  to  the  mere  feeling  of  fear  
that  is  within  him  or  her.  Notwithstanding this  line  of  argument,  I  still put   forth my 
views  that  maybe  if  it  was  just  a fear  of  new  inventions  that  I  suffer  from,  I  would  
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not  have  gone  so  far  with  spelling  out  the  facts  that  the  universe  has  many  
representations  to  different  individuals  situated  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  in  
different  time  periods,  and  no  natural  individual  can  encompass  them  all  at  one  
time  and  forever.   
Furthermore,  I  refute the believe   in  miracles  and  supernatural  matters in this study,  
because thinking  of  a  miracle  would equal thinking of  something  like  the universal  
reason  which demands  the  breaking  (or  at  least  bending)  of  the  laws  of  nature,  if  
not  transforming  the  world  and  nature  itself.  Descartes122  explained  a  miracle  as  the  
breaking  or  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature  in  order  to  produce  that  which  has  more  
extraordinary   or  supernatural  explanation  that  brings  more  misery  than  what is 
ordinary  or  normally  known  and  understood.  In  this  real  life,  it  is  reasonably  scary  
to  put  trust  in  miracles  and  extraordinary  fantasies  that  may  happen  and  be  beneficial  
or  that may not  happen. In this  case,  the  successful  happening  of  universal  reason  
and  adding  to  the  progress  of  philosophy  would  be  very  much  a  misery.  At  the  
same  time, the  thinking  that  embracing  the  idea  of  universal  reason  will  harm  
nothing  in  this  world, sounds more like  hoping  for   a  serious  miserable  miracle.  The  
imploration   in  this  study is  to  be  more  realistic  and  use  what  works  for  the  people  
in  this  world  other  than  hoping  for  things  that  seem  to  have   no  capability  to  occur  
in  this  world. 
3.2.2 Discrediting the universal reason as a miracle 
Some  hopeful  defenders  of  universal  reason   may  argue   that  the  idea  of  universal  
reason  should  be  embraced  or  be  accepted  as  some  sort  of  development  in  reasoning.   
Since  everything  develops  from  being  small  to  become  bigger  and  great,  it  should  
not  be  hard   to  accept  that  thought   also  develops  now  to  become  universal,  and no  
longer  limited  as  it  always  has  been123.  This  way  of  viewing   the  idea  of  universal  
reason  however  is  most  likely  to  come  from  people  who  are  too  optimistic,  the  
saints  who  always  see  a  progressive  possibility  even  in  an  open  hell  of  destruction,  
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because  if  universal  reason  is  the  development   in  philosophical   reason,  it  should  
be  improving   it (reason)  and  resonating   with  human  beings  that  live  in  this  world  
and  their  experiences.   It  is  flawed  to  think  that  something  that  seems  to  have  no  
connection  with  this  world  and  to  the  people   of  this  world is  development  which  
should   be  welcomed  and celebrated.  So I see it reasonable  to  dismiss   any  idea  which  
hopes   from  something   unknown  and  does  not  even  promise  to  have  any  relation  
with  the  minds  that  reason  in  this  world.  Rejecting  the  idea  of  universal  reason  as  
a  development  in  human  reasoning   is  reasonable  because   development  is  a  thing  
or  a  process  that   drives refinement  or  improvement.124   In terms  of  reason  it  should  
be  a  way  of  thought  that  will   improve  or  come  with  some  kind  of  refinement  to  
human  beings  that  exist  in  this  world. However,  the  moment  it  lacks  characteristics  
of  speaking  to  individuals  in  this  world,  it  becomes  something  else,  then  to  view  
it  as  progressive  is  defective.  It  must  be  stated  that   the  idea  of  universal  reason  is  
an  unnecessary  despise,  an  underestimating  of  the  nature  of  human  reason  itself,  
meaning to  view  it  as  a  development   in  reason  means  the  existence  of  some  
deficiency  in  human  thought. 
Within  the above reasoning,  some  people  may  ask  why  are  we  (people  who  dismiss 
Universal  reason)  so  pessimistic towards  the  idea.  This  question  is  most  likely  to  
come  from  those  who  see  this  idea  of  universalising  the  thought  as  a  development  
of  philosophy. It is  naturally  expected  that  once  a  person   sees  such  a  thing  as  a  
development, them my argument and presentation to the contrary that it  is  not  to  be  
accepted  will  sound  pessimistic  indeed.  However, I  would  like  clearly state that  being  
pessimistic  would  have  applied,  or  someone  would  creditably  accuse  us  of  being  
pessimistic  if  what  we  say  in  dismissing  this  idea  were  accusations  or  comments  
of  dislike  that  have  no  basis  in  reasoning.  So far, I  think  it  has  been made clear in 
this study  that  there  is  no  pessimism  at  all  in  dismissing  this  idea  of  universal  
reason. Also, it  is  worth  saying  that  hopes,  ambitions,  visions  and  dreams  should  
have  some  limits,  people  should  not  hope  for  too  much  than  what  can  reasonably  
come  through.  To  think  and  hope  that  there   will  be  something   like  universal  reason  
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that  will  be   accepted  and  be  useful  in  this  world,  is  the  direct  abuse  of  hope  and  
in  turn  it  promises  no  good  results  for  the  life  of  philosophy  itself.  So,  rejecting  
this  idea  of  universal  reason  in  philosophy  is   not  being  pessimistic  at  all,  it   is  
simply  an  understanding  of  the  world  more clearly.  It is also  a  way  of  placing  all  
the  unnecessary  visions  of  optimistic  ideas  coming  from  all  the  unreasonable  
fantasies. Besides,  it  is  within  the  purpose  of  this  research  to  highlight  the  fact  that  
anything  that  does  not  seem  to  fit  in  with  the  natural  conditions  of  this  world,  
must  be  strongly  rejected  until  it  resonates  with  this  world. This is because  in having  
such  things  bothering  our  minds,  we  could  end  up  missing  real  things  that  are  
important  to  the  nature  in  this  world.  All  in  all,  it  not  pessimism  to state  that  things  
that  do  not  benefit  any  human  in  this  world  should  be  rejected, in  fact  I  see  that  
as  a true  form  of  optimism  towards  new  inventions. 
3.3. The ordinary reason as a solution 
It is my view that  ordinary  reason  is  more  sound  than  all  other  systems  of  reason,  
especially  more  sound  and  positive  than  the  idea  of   universal  reason  in  this  world.  
In  this  world  it  is  more  reasonable  to  be honest  and  not  trust  in  miracles  and  
revelations  even  in  instances  where  there  is  no   need  to  do  so125. Also,  it  is  the  
same  for  those  who  trust  too  much  in  supernatural  intervention, which for me is  self-
abuse  because  sometimes  it  can  be  viewed  as  an  unnecessary   abuse   of   belief  
faculty.  In terms of reason, expecting  that  there  will  never  be  something  fit  and  
acceptable  to  be  branded  ‘a  universal  reason’  seems   just  like  expecting  a  divine  
intervention  to  take  place.  It  is  written  that  only  God  existed  eternally  and  possesses  
the  knowledge  of  all  things,  and  that  is  the  one  who  all-sees  and  who  is  all-present,  
the  one  who  possesses  the  capability  of    not  being affected  by  time  and  place  or  
history126.  But  even  then, when  I  speak  of  the  eternity  of  God,  I  do  not  mean  he 
or she  is  timeless, I  simply  mean he or she  is  ever-living  or  ever-existing.  Saying  that  
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he  has  no  difference  between  yesterday,  today,  and  tomorrow127  it  becomes  clear  
how  defective  it  would  be  to  accept  the  universal  reason  which  would  be  timeless,  
while  the  world  is  never  time  blind.  In  fact,  even  in  the  divine  books,128 God  has  
presented  his  existence  in  different  times,  to  different  people  in  many  different  ways,  
not   in  one  universal  way.  So  even  if  someone  would  invoke  God  in  the  invention  
of  universal  reason  it  seems  that  he  could  not  be  helped  at   all,  therefore  trusting  
in  the  miraculous  supernatural  powers  does  not  also help  in  running  away  from  
ordinary  reason  to  the  universal  reason.  Furthermore,  thinking  that  reason  should  be  
one  and  not  affected  by  these  factors (time,  space,  and  history)  is  just  an  emotional  
unrest  of  hating  diversity  and  truthfulness,  it  is  accompanied  by  evil  desires  to  
corrupt  that  which  is  pure,  clean  and  natural  in  thought. 
However,  a  humanitarian  person  may  come  and  say  that  sticking  to  the  idea   of  
ordinary   reason  makes  people  see  themselves  as different  to   others  on  the  grounds  
that  they  live  in  different  places,  at  different  times,  and  have  other  historicised  
experiences129.  A  person  arguing  in  this  line  of  thought  may  be  quite  creditable,  
but if  we  take  it  further   and  think  of  it  more, it  becomes  clear  as  a  matter  of  
sacrifice,  in  a  sense  that  such  argument  diplomatically  tells  us  to  divorce  truthfulness  
of  reality  due  to  the  pursuit  of  humanitarian  oneness  (in  this  case  universality).  
Jewsiewicki130  said  “variety  is  a  spice  of  life  with  meaning  and  reality”,  and  in my 
view, this  means  that  diversity  in  life, in  fact,  in  existence   even  beyond  the  life  in  
this  world is  what  gives  meaning  to  the  presence  of  beings. This means that even  in  
thought,  it  is  normal  to  have  differentiated  thoughts  and  experiences  that  will  be  
different  in  their  expressions.  Eze  makes  it  clear  that  diversity  is  not  a  bad  thing  
at  all,  and   should  be  welcomed, and  rather  than  being  viewed  as  an  objectionable  
thing  in  life,  it  must  be  viewed  as  the  identity  of  how  things  are131.  Additionally,  
he  contends  that  most  [if  not  always]  people  know  things  in   this  world   by  knowing   
their  opposites.   For  example,  white  would  have  no  meaning  if  black  was  not  
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known,  and  even  in  the  world  of  spirits  heaven  would  have  never  been  known (let  
alone  being  appreciated)  if  hell  was  not  known,  in  fact  the  whole  nature  of  existence  
would  be  boring  to  the  depth  of  height.  It  is  understandable  that   some  people  
amongst   the  human  species  will  never  be  satisfied,  they  will  always  want  to  add  
or  eliminate  something. However, I  think  that  such  enthusiasm  should  be  controlled  
and  be  kept  within  limits  because  it  may  cause  more  unnecessary  destruction.  The  
enthusiasm  of  wanting  to  leave  the  ordinary  reason  and  bother  about  something  
likely to  be  known  as  the  universal  reason   is  improper  and  defective  to  the  extent  
that  it  may  be  more  destructive  to  the  reasoning  itself. 
It should  be  understood  that  philosophy  is  interesting  as  a  love  of  wisdom132  because  
it  shows  different  faces  of  reason  or  thought  with  respect  to  the  difference  in  time,  
geographic  space,  and  historicised  experiences  and so  on.  In  this  way,  it  keeps  itself  
lovely  and  lively  to  those  who  are  interested  in  obtaining  the  understanding  of  
natural  beings  with  their  identities.  If  taken  at  that  level  of  understanding,  it  sounds  
more  reasonable  to  welcome  thought  as  differentiated  as  it  is,  and  never  try  to  
forge  it  into  one  singularity  that  seems  to  mean  nothing  to  the  existing  nature  of  
beings  in  this  world.  In this given,  I  attempt  to  suggest  that  the  coming  into  existence  
of  something  called  universal  reason  (let  alone  that  there  is  no  hope  that  such  kind  
of  a  thing  will  ever  come  to  existence  and  manifest  in  this  world  while  this  world  
is  still  as  natural  as  it  is)  will  be  the  entrance  of  boredom   in  studying  reason  or  
philosophy.  In  fact   it  will  inflict  boredom  of  a  higher  degree  because  it  will  not  
be  speaking  the  truth  about  this  world  that  people  exist  and  live  in,  and  at  the  
same  time  people  will  be  needing  ways  of  reason  that  speak  to  them  at  a   particular  
time,  area  or  place,  and  expressing  their  individuated  historicised  experiences.  In  
most  cases  if  not  all,  people  have  an  interest  in  things  that  resonate  with  them  or  
that  speak  directly  to  their  standards  of  existence  and  nature.  Ordinary  reason speaks  
directly  to  human  beings  and  the  nature  of  their  existence  in  this  world,  and  without  
some  unnecessary  compromise  that  universal  reason  seems  to  ask  for, or  even  
demand.  Also,  in  speaking  of   developmental  invention,  it  is  worth  saying  that  
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universal  reason  will  not  [in  any  way]  be  a  developmental  invention  at  all  to  natural  
humans  in  this  known  and  occupied  universe. Instead, universal reason would be  a  
complication  to  the  already  uneasy  world, given that  even  the  language  of  it  would  
most  probably  not be the  language  of  this  natural  world. 
3.4. Conclusion  
In  this  chapter,  I  have  discussed  the  challenges  that  may  be  given  by  those  who  
find  the  idea  of  universal  reason  an  acceptable  improvement  to  world  philosophy.  I  
also endeavoured   to  illustrate  that  seeing  the  idea  of  universal  reason  as  harmless  
as  other  concepts  used  in  politics, such as  globalisation  and  democracy,  will  never  
help  because  even  those  concepts  accommodate  some  diversity  within  them. The  
basic  reason  for  the  argument  in  this  chapter  was  to  reveal   that  the  idea  of  universal  
reason  looks  more  like  hoping  for  a  miracle  which  will  not  even  be  related  to  the  
life  of  human  beings  in  this  world. This chapter built upon this argument and defended 
the  idea  of  ordinary  reason  which  speaks  to  the  differentially  individuated  and  
historicised  experiences  of  diverse  human  beings  in  this  natural  world. In all, this 
chapter of the thesis made a case in arguing that  ordinary  reason  is  better  because  it  
presents  reasoning  as  it  is  experienced  by  a  particular  person  in  whatever  way  it  






4. Conclusion                         
In   this  dissertation,  although  I  argued  that  it  is  bias  to  say  Africa  has  no  philosophy,  
I  did  not  explain  what  African  philosophy  is. Talking  about  the  definition  of  African  
philosophy  would  have derailed  the  focus of  this  work, as the study was  meant  to  
focus  only on  the  conception  of  reason    universally. More so,  talking  about  African  
philosophy  or  any  specific  philosophy  would  deviated  this study from its   point  of 
focus and  added  unnecessary  length   to  this  research. Likewise, I  avoided being baised  
in  this  work  by  presenting   arguments  for  both  the  defence  of  universal  reason  and  
the defence of ordinary  reason.   
This study discussed the issues  raised  by  the  idea  of  universal  reason  in  this  natural  
world, by bringing to fore the fact that universal  reason  has  been  used  as  a  reason  or  
a  way  of  thought  that  extends  beyond  the  naturally preserved constants which are;  
time (epoch),  space  or  place,  and  history  of  the  natural  people.  This  concept of 
universal reasoning as propounded by  some  philosophers of   Western  origin, seemed to 
have been based on  their thought and system of reason or philosophy that  the general 
sense  of  being  is always the same everywhere,  at  all  times, and  without  any  effect  of  
history or  particular  experiences  that  had effect on  individuals. In the introduction of 
this study, a narrative of the writings of some western philosophers like David Hume and 
Emmanuel Kant was examined.  These philosophers produced  a  philosophy full of racist 
views  that sought to ridicule other nations (especially  the Negroes) to the  extent of  
reducing  them  to  the  level  of  animals  with no natural capability  to  produce   philosophy  
or  any system  of  thought.  In  this  work  I have clarified  that these philosophers  were  
not  just  mere  racist  but  they  seriously  thought,  understood   and  projected  their  ideas  
or  views  consciously. When  they  were  trying  to  convince  the  world  that  their  
thoughts  are  forever  (as  they  were/ are)  as  long  as  the  nature  of  this  world  exists,  
and  that their kind  of  thinking  brought  a lot of  hindrances  and  objections  when  the  
idea  of  universalising  the  thought  came  up. 
Accusing  the  Negroes  of  having  no  system  of  thought  or  philosophy  and  then  
suggesting  that  there  must  be  a  universal  thought,  simply reads as  “accept  our  
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Western  system  of  reason  as  permanently  dominant,  forget  about  yourselves”.  This  
argued against the views  of  these  Western  philosophers, stating that the  whole  idea  of  
universal  reason is unacceptable because  it  seems  like  a  wave  of  thought  imperialism  
by  the  West. The study also showed  that  there  was   too  much  racial  prejudice  
manifested  in  the  works  of  ancient  Western  philosophers   to  the  extent  that  they  
even  ridiculed  these  who  challenged  them.  While this study did not particularly aimed 
to   elevate  one reason  over  another, it however sought to  preclude the introducing  
Western  thought  imperialism  and a  kind  of  reasoning that does not hold or bear  
relevance  to  this  ordinary world.  In this light,  the study  asserted that  any  thought  
produced  by  a  human  in  this  world  is  ordinary  in  the  sense  that  it  is  affected  by  
factors  like  time,  place,  individual  history  and  experience.  This  follows  from   the  
words  of  Emmanuel  Chukwudi  Eze   who  explained  reasoning  as  a  kind  of  disposition  
that  speaks  to  the  individuated  and  historicised  experiences,  which  he  called  ordinary  
reason133.  Ordinary  reason  itself  seems  to  be  the  kind  of  reasoning  that  has  been  
used  all  along   in  this  world, given that all  philosophers,  including  Hume  and  Kant,  
were  great  philosophers  of  their  time  and  their  thoughts  were  affected  by  their  era 
(time),  place  (where  they  lived/  West),  and  history  (which  includes  their  individual  
experiences,  perceptions,  and  so  on   which  influenced  their  views). 
Generally, the arguments presented in this study were motivated by the  conflict  in  
philosophy, a conflict  that  exists  around  the  issue  of  universal  reason  and  its  
acceptability.  The  idea  of  universalising  thought  sounds or sounded  good  so  much  
so  that  some  philosophers  see  nothing  wrong  with  it,  while  others  like  Eze, perceive 
it  to  be  the  worst  nightmare  ever  to  exist  in  this  world.  Both  sides  seem  to  have  
reasons  which  attracted  my  attention. I  came  to  notice  that  reasons  for  supporting   
Eze’s  ordinary  reason  looks more  solid  than  the  reasons  for  the  invention  of  
‘Universal  reason’.  One  of  the  aims  in  undertaking  this  critical  work   was  to  explain  
and  clarify  that  reason  as  a  human  activity  mean  nothing  when  it  does  not  relate  
to  human  beings.  From this, it becomes evident that thought must have a direct   relation   
with the one who produces it.  Once  this point  is  established, another evident fact to 
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reckon with is  that   since  all  natural  human  beings  in  this  natural  world  are  affected  
by  time,  space,  and  history,  their  system  of  reason  must  therefore encompass  those  
things.  Moreover,  once  thought  is  taken  to  a  level  beyond  natural  human  beings 
(subject  to  time,  space,  and  history),it  is  no  longer  suitable  to  be  welcomed  by  
them  in  this  world  because  that  kind  of  reason  itself  cannot be  from  this  world.  
Therefore,  it  is  best  if  such reason is  used  in  the  place  where  it  came  from,  by  
those  who  consider themselves  universal.  Besides, producing  the so-called  universal  
reason  needs  a  being  that  is  omniscient  (all-knowing),  omnipresent  (present  
everywhere  all  the  time),  and  eternal (everlasting  as  in  being  timeless)134,  and   surely  
such  a  being  would  not  be  a  human. 
Within  this  piece  of  writing,  the  belief  in  miracles  was  discredited  together  with the 
view of  universal  reason  as  a  development  in  thought.  Discrediting  miracles,  dreams,  
visions  and  all  things  of   such  nature  was presented based on the  fact  that   they  need  
lot  of  faith  in  the  extraordinary,  while  people  live  and  exist   in  the  ordinary  natural  
world135.  The  idea  of  universal  reason  seems to be based on  miraculous  and  
supernatural  hopes, and it  is  considerably   supernatural  to  think  that  there  will  be  a  
universal  thought  (untouched  by  the  effects  of  time,  space,  and  history)  while  
produced  by  natural  people  who  are  directly  affected  by  the  natural  factors.   It  even 
becomes more  unbelievable  to  think  that  such  kind  of  reason will  make  sense  and 
be accepted or appreciated by  the  human  beings  in  this  world. In view of this, the first 
question that came to mind as I presented my arguments in this study was; who  shall  
produce  such universal reason;   in  what  state  of  mind  will  he/  she  be  while  doing  
it,  and  how  shall  it  be  understandable  to  the  people  of  this  natural  world?   In effect,  
if  any  person  may  honestly  ponder  over  such  basic  questions  it  would  become  very  
easy  to   see  that  there  exist quite much beyond  the  word  ‘universal  reason’,  it  is  not  
just  a  decorative  word,  it  means  something  deeper  which  will  never  be  possibly  
established  in  this  world.  Also  other  issues  that  seemed  convincing  about  the  idea  
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of  universal  reason  have  been  reviewed  and  critically  dealt  with  in  this  piece  of  
writing.  But most significant  to  the  arguments  of  this  project, is the fact that it  started  
by  spelling  out  that  all  humans  are  naturally  the  same  and  equal  before  nature  and  
existence, and the same  applies to  their  thoughts  no  matter  where  they  are,  who  they  
are,  and  at  what  time  they  live. 
Furthermore, the study presented and defended Emmanuel Eze’s view   that   universal   
reason    is   a   reasonably   objectionable   idea.  Taking everything into account,   this 
study   cross-examined   the   views   from   both sides,   as it pertains to universal reason   
and   ordinary   reason.  In discussing  the  ordinary   reason,    this study  compared   and   
critically   analysed it   as  a  kind   of   reason   which   is   within   time  (era),  space  
(place  in   this   world),  and   history   of  humans   in   this  natural   world. Thus I 
presented the ordinary reason to be more sensible to relate with and understand in the 
context of this world.  In view of this kind of reason, I also pointed out that  amazingly, 
people  in  this  world  have all  along  been  exercising  ordinary  reason/thought;  no  one  
has  ever  been  engaged  in  something that  has  the  form  of  what  is  portrayed  by  this  
idea  of  universal  reason;  and  there  has  been  nothing  philosophically  wrong  with  it.  
In line with this argument,  Eze  also  pointed  out  that  nature  itself  is  beautified  by 
variation  to  the  extent  that  diversity  should  be  embraced,  and  not  repelled  because  
even  the  knowledge  of  things  is  acquired  through  the  knowledge  of  what  they  are  
not136.  So the point of departure for this study was to ensure the  realisation  that  nature  
presents  different  versions  of   itself  in  different  people  differently,  according  to  time,  
space,  and  history. This makes universal   reason  to be nothing  but  a  dream,  disturbance  
and  ultimate  confusion  of  the  natural  human  mind  in  this  natural  world. I appeal to 
other philosophers who are interested in the question of rationality, thought, and 
universality to make inquiry on the issue of what makes ordinary reason not convincing 
beside its counterpart Western so-called universal reason.   
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